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This article discusses the applicability of the public use bar
and the experimental use exception to patent validity and
enforceability in the context of clinical testing of
pharmaceuticals and medical devices, and as this testing may
relate to U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) clinical
testing requirements.1  This article will outline the history and
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1. At the outset, the reader is cautioned to note that there are several
“experimental use” theories in patent law, each of which is different.
Experimental use arises under the first theory of infringing the patent so that
the infringer may obtain necessary clinical data to support FDA related
approval applications so that generic products are available when the primary
patent expires.  See Shashank Upadhye, Understanding Patent Infringement
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e): The Collisions Between Patent, Medical Device, and
Drug Laws, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (2000); 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).  The second theory occurs when the infringer builds
the patented invention merely to satisfy his own curiosity of whether the
invention actually works or whether the patent sufficiently teaches how to use
the invention.  The infringement occurs in the context of “experimenting” to
determine operability or sufficiency of teaching.  This second theory is also
often called the “de minimis use” exception.  See Embrex Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g
Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  The
third theory occurs when the patentee attempts to either classify his own or
others’ invalidating public uses as experimental uses.  This article concerns
the last theory.
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application of the public use bar.  The article argues that courts
are inconsistent in their application, and accordingly, a reform
or paradigm shift is necessary.  Such reform is necessary
because a bright line rule will foster predictability for both
patentees and competitors alike.  In addition, because other
recent significant and economically practical alternatives exist,
there is now less need for liberal application of an already
nebulous concept.
Identifying public use issues becomes very important in the
context of litigation or due diligence.  Prior public use is
grounds for patent invalidity.  Accordingly, those in litigation
may make prior public use a priority to invalidate the patent.
Those in due diligence may take extra care in conducting the
due diligence.  For example, if a company is acquiring a patent,
the acquirer will investigate the patent’s vulnerability.  The
entire deal may collapse if the public use is sufficient to
question the validity.  If the patent forms part of an asset pool
being purchased or licensed, then the valuation of the pool may
be compromised because of the potentially invalid patent.  In a
sense, the vulnerable patent infects the pool.  While the
vulnerable patent may not be enough to kill the deal, it may
warrant further re-negotiation.  If the patent forms part of a
bankruptcy corpus, the valuation of the corpus is compromised.
A trustee in bankruptcy cannot adequately value the corpus
and cannot make informed decisions about whether to license
the patent or sell the corpus to generate additional income.  For
a medical company, the vulnerability of the patent may dictate
whether the company is willing to commercialize the product
and invest the millions necessary for clinical data and FDA
approval.  Finally, investigating any patent’s vulnerability will
dictate whether that patent can be enforced without incurring
antitrust liability.
In drug or medical device research and development, a
patentee2 often conducts clinical trials to evaluate and perfect a
newly developed drug or device, or to establish safety and
efficacy prior to applying for a patent.3  At one extreme, a
2. As used herein, the term “patentee” is synonymous with the term
“patent holder,” “inventor,” “assignor,” or “patent owner” to avoid confusion.
Accordingly, the terms should be understood to apply generically to the party
who allegedly created the public use, whether it is the inventor or subsequent
patent owner.
3. See generally Upadhye, supra note 1, at 6; 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 351, 352,
355(a) (2000).
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physician may utilize a medical device of his own design in
treating patients in his private medical practice.  At the other
extreme, a pharmaceutical company may conduct formal, large-
scale research and often will associate with doctors at local or
out-of-state hospitals to perform clinical trials.  Recruitment of
patients and other investigators in some cases necessitates
publicity of such clinical trials.4  As analyzed below, such
outside research that occurs prior to the filing date of a patent
application may constitute public use and raise the possibility
that the court will find the patent invalid.5
35 U.S.C. § 102(a) invalidates an issued patent if the
invention was known or used by persons other than the
inventor6 in the United States, before the invention date of the
patent.7  Similarly, § 102(b) invalidates an issued patent if the
invention was in “public use” or “on sale” in the U.S. more than
one year prior to the issued patent’s filing date.8  Accordingly,
under § 102(a), the invalidating use must be by others, whereas
under § 102(b), the invalidating public use can be performed by
the inventor or by others.9  In essence, when a public use of an
invention occurs more than one year prior to the filing date,
patentability of the invention is lost.10  The filing date is critical
because the filing date freezes the universe of prior art that
may be used against the patent.  So, under § 102(a), the
universe of prior art includes art that has a date anytime
before the patent’s earliest effective filing date.  For § 102(b),
the universe of prior art includes art that is dated more than
4. But see, Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d
1520, 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding an exempt use under 35 U.S.C. §
271(e)(1)); see generally, Upadhye supra, note 1, at 30-43.
5. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).  For other areas of FDA regulatory
interaction with patent law and other FDA-oriented defenses to patent
infringement, see generally, Upadhye, supra note 1.
6. For simplicity, use of the singular “inventor” also means sole or joint
inventors.
7. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent
unless . . . (a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country,
before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent.”)
8. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . .
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or
a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States”).
9. Id.
10. Id. The filing date is the earliest effective filing date allowable under
35 U.S.C. §§ 119, 120, or 121 (2000).
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one year before the patent’s earliest effective filing date.  As a
matter of strategy, it is best to find § 102(b) art to invalidate
the patent.  Most public use issues in the FDA regulatory
process context involve use by the inventor, by others, or by
both.
Accordingly, the potential drug or medical device patentee
faces a very real dilemma: (1) whether to test the product in
large-scale trials to generate the necessary clinical data
required by the FDA, but risk creating a public use bar; or (2)
file a patent application and incur the associated costs prior to
any clinical testing, not knowing if the product will ever be
marketed or will even work.
As an aside, also noteworthy is that public use in a foreign
country does not constitute a bar to patentability.11  This is
likely due to Congress’s belief that discovering printed
publications or patents in the U.S. or abroad was easier than
trying to discover undocumented foreign public uses. This
vestige may be less applicable in the modern global context.
Nonetheless, § 102 has not been amended to encompass foreign
public use or foreign sales as a bar to patentability.
The theme of this article relates to the interaction of the
public use bar, the putative experimental use exception,12 and
the use of drugs or devices in medical testing or clinical trials.
Part I begins with a basic primer on the public use bar.  Part II
details some common situations that may arise in clinical trial
management.  Part III discusses early public use cases and the
law’s progressive evolution.  Part IV discusses the development
of the experimental use doctrine.  Part V begins a detailed
analysis of the public use test and its factors.  Part V also
describes each factor and cases that give significant weight to
each factor.  Part VI discusses whether the question of
11. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
12. As will be seen in Part IV et seq., public use may be considered distinct
from “experimental use.”  Classifying an activity as experimental use may
negate a finding of public use.  Essentially, experimental use is use that is for
experimental purposes and thus should be “excused” from being classified as
an invalidating public use.  See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d 1641, 1645 (1998) (“Nevertheless, an inventor who seeks to perfect
his discovery may conduct extensive testing without losing his right to obtain
a patent for his invention . . . even if such testing occurs in the public eye.”).
Experimental use is discussed more fully in Parts IV, V, and VI infra.
“Experimental use negates public use; when proved, it may show that
particular acts, even if apparently public in a colloquial sense, do not
constitute a public use.”  Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. COBE Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054,
1059, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1437, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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experimental use is a distinct inquiry from the question of
public use.  Part VII posits reform in the public use doctrine by
discussing whether the public use doctrine ought to be liberally
or narrowly construed and establishes a new rule called the
“first clear chance” rule.  In essence, this new rule puts the
onus on the inventor as the person having the first clear chance
to protect the invention or file the application.  Part VIII
concludes that a narrower construction of the public use
doctrine is necessary.
I. A PRIMER ON THE PUBLIC USE BAR
The courts define public use as “any use of [the claimed]
invention by a person other than the inventor who is under no
limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy to the inventor”.13
As mentioned earlier, when public use of an invention occurs
more than one year prior to the filing date, patentability of the
invention is lost.14  This seems like a harsh penalty for delay,
but as the court noted in Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp.,15 there are
several policy reasons for imposing the public use and on-sale
bars.16  These policies include:
(A) “One policy underlying the public use bar is to obtain
widespread disclosure of new inventions to the public
via patents as soon as possible.”17
(B)The public use and on-sale bars are meant “to prevent
the inventor from commercially exploiting the
exclusivity of his [or her] invention substantially
beyond the statutorily authorized . . . period.”18
(C)Another underlying policy for the public use and on-
13. Petrolite Corp. v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 96 F.3d 1423, 1425, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127,
1134, 218 U.S.P.Q. 976, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Egbert v. Lippmann, 104
U.S. 333, 336 (1881) (the “corset” case))); 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
15. Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321,
1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1015 (1995).
16. Section 102(b) provides in relevant part that “[a] person shall be
entitled to a patent unless . . . the invention was . . . on sale in this country,
more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United
States . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court
established a two-prong test governing the application of the on-sale bar:
“First, the product must be the subject of a commercial offer for sale. . . .
Second, the invention must be ready for patenting.”  Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67.
17. RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1062, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
1449, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
18. Id.; see MPEP § 2133.03(e)(1).
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sale bars is to discourage “the removal of inventions
from the public domain which the public justifiably
comes to believe are freely available.”19
Although the public use bar and on-sale bar reside in the
same section of the statute, and in some cases the policies
underlying the on-sale bar also support the public use bar in
theory,20 the bars are directed at different goals.  Judge Rich
noted that
“[p]ublic use” and “on-sale” bars, while they share the same statutory
basis, are grounded on different policy emphases. The primary policy
underlying the “public use” case is that of detrimental public reliance,
whereas the primary policy underlying an “on-sale” case is that of
prohibiting the commercial exploitation of the design beyond the
statutorily prescribed time period.
21
Other Federal Circuit decisions indicate that prevention of
improper commercial exploitation is the foremost policy
concern.22
II. APPLYING PUBLIC USE TO CLINICAL TRIALS AND
THE COMMON SCENARIOS
If public use can invalidate a patent, how does public use
under the statute square with clinical trials?  The FDA laws do
not impose any restrictions on enrolled patients to maintain
confidentiality during such trials.  In fact, the only relevant
confidentiality laws are those imposed on the doctor to not
reveal patient information and the duty of obtaining the
patient’s informed consent.23
In the medical device field, a doctor often implants the
19. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 550, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1591 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting King Instrument Corp. v.
Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860, 226 U.S.P.Q. 402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  “[T]he
overriding focus of section 102(b) is preventing inventors from reaping the
benefits of the patent system beyond the statutory term.”  Ferag AG v. Quipp,
Inc., 45 F.3d 1562, 1567-68, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1512, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Allied
Colloids Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d. 1570, 1574, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1840,
1842 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
20. Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. COBE Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1058, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Tone Bros., 28 F.3d at 1198.
21. Continental Plastic Containers v. Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., 141
F.3d 1073, 1079, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
22. Ferag AG, 45 F.3d at 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Barmag Barmer
Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach, Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1375, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225,
1250-51 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Mayer, J., concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part).
23. 21 C.F.R. pt. 50 (2002).
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device into patients at a hospital or uses the device during
routine operations.  If such open and unrestricted use is
deemed public, the problem becomes evident that future
patentability may be foreclosed under § 102(b).
In response, the patentee will argue that this hospital or
clinical trial use is an exception to the public use doctrine.24
The patentee often tries to characterize this activity as
“experimental use”.25  Thus, a dispute arises about whether a
particular activity is a public use or an experimental use.26
Testing drugs and devices in vivo and in vitro prior to filing the
patent application may create significant problems.  As shown
below in Part V, the normal procedures of associating with
physicians to conduct trials introduce a variety of problems
that include the sheer number of people involved and the public
nature of the testing.
Therefore, an understanding of the historical origin of the
public use bar is useful to determine if that historical
application applies to the modern FDA clinical trial process.
Factors that the early courts considered important may apply
to the modern scenarios.
24. The infringer bears the burden of proving invalidity by clear and
convincing evidence.  Once the infringer establishes a prima facie case of
public use invalidity by clear and convincing evidence, then the patentee bears
the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged uses
were experimental.  Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120 n.4, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d 1100, 1104 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting the trial court’s jury
instructions: “[t]he law places the burden on the [patentee] to come forward
with convincing evidence showing that these uses were experimental uses”).
25. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.  An experimental use is
defined as “perfecting or completing an invention to the point of determining
that it will work for its intended purpose.”  RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887
F.2d 1056, 1061, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  In addition, it is the
claimed invention that must be in public use or subject to experimentation.
The inquiry is not whether unclaimed features are in public use or in
experimentation.  In re Brigance, 792 F.2d 1103, 1109, 229 U.S.P.Q. 988, 991-
92 (Fed. Cir. 1986); W. Marine Elecs., Inc. v. Furuno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840,
847, 226 U.S.P.Q. 334, 339 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 793, 204
U.S.P.Q. 188, 193-94 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
26. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1641 (1998)
(“Nevertheless, an inventor who seeks to perfect his discovery may conduct
extensive testing without losing his right to obtain a patent for his
invention . . . even if such testing occurs in the public eye.”). “Experimental
use negates public use; when proved, it may show that particular acts, even if
apparently public in a colloquial sense, do not constitute a public use.” Baxter
Int’l, Inc. v. COBE Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054,  1059, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1437, 1441
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
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III.EARLY PUBLIC USE CASES – A BROAD DEFINITION
OF PUBLIC USE AND NARROWLY TAILORED
EXCEPTIONS
One of the earliest public use cases was the 1881 “corset
case” of Egbert v. Lippmann.27  In 1855, Egbert complained
about corset problems to others including her future husband,
Barnes.28  Barnes made several inventive corsets from 1855 to
1858, which he presented to Egbert and which she then wore
under her clothes in the course of her daily activities, including
going out in public.  At some time between 1855 and 1863,
Barnes and Egbert married.  In 1863, Barnes told Sturgis of his
new corsets and showed them to Sturgis only once.  Barnes
applied for the patent in March 1866 and the patent issued in
July 1866.  The patent statute, at the time, allowed a two-year
period following the first public use during which the inventor
could apply for a patent.29
The Supreme Court gave three main reasons for
invalidating the patent.  First, the Court stated that a single
use in public can qualify as a public use, and public use does
not rise or fall on the number of times the patented article was
actually used in public.  Multiple uses, however, may give more
weight to the public use charge.30
Second, public use does not depend on the number of
people to whom its use is known.  A public use by a single
person can invalidate the patent if the donee, grantee, or
vendee of the invention is not under a restriction of secrecy, or
other limitation on the public disclosure.31
Third, public use does not depend on the publicly visible
character of the invention.  As the Court hypothesized, many
inventions are merely components embedded within the overall
machine and are hidden from view.  Thus, when the inventor
operates the overall machine including the inventive
component, without any restrictions of secrecy, that action
creates a public use.32  Because Barnes constructed his
invention and allowed it to be used by another who was under
27. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881).
28. Id. at 335.
29. Act of July 4, 1836, 5 Stat. 117; as qualified by Act of March 3, 1839, 5
Stat. 353.  Congress reduced the grace period time to one year in the 1839 Act.
30. Egbert, 104 U.S. at 336.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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no constraints of secrecy for almost eleven years prior to filing
the patent application, the public use barred the patent.
Justice Miller’s dissent argued that one policy reason
behind the public use bar rested in the public’s belief that it
was free to copy the invention.33  Focusing on the term “public,”
Justice Miller argued that because Egbert wore the corset
under her clothes and never displayed the corset to others in
public, and because the public could not see the corset, the
public was not able to copy it because they had no access to it.34
Thus, the public was ignorant of the invention prior to the
patent application date.
A. THE SMITH & GRIGGS CASE: REFINING THE DEFINITION OF
“PUBLIC USE.”
Shortly after the Egbert decision, the Supreme Court in
Smith & Griggs Manufacturing Co. v. Sprague refined its
interpretation of the statutory language, stating that a public
use that bars access to the patent system is: (i) a use more than
two years (now one year) before the patent filing date, and (ii) a
use in which a completed invention is used in public, without
restriction and in circumstances other than “substantially for
the purposes of experiment.”35  The Smith & Griggs case was
one of the first cases to modify the definition of public use to
include use of the completed invention.  The Court also used
the term “experiment” as a possible defense to public use.36
B. THE ELECTRIC STORAGE CASE: DOES THE INVENTOR’S
INTENTION MATTER?
The Supreme Court in Electric Storage Battery Co. v.
Shimadzu,37 clarified certain issues involving public use.  First,
the Court clarified that invalidity due to public use is an
33. Id. at 338-39 (Miller, J. dissenting).
34. Id.
35. 123 U.S. 249, 256 (1887).  The Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117,
included an “on-sale” bar that precluded patentability for any commercial
activity before the application was filed.  This was a statutory codification of
the absolute novelty bar enunciated in Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1,
24 (1829).  The Patent Act of 1839 created a 2-year grace period for the
inventor to file the application.  5 Stat. 353; see also Andrews v. Hovey, 123
U.S. 267, 274 (1887).  The Patent Act of 1939 reduced the grace period from
two years to one year. 53 Stat. 1212.
36. Smith & Griggs, 123 U.S. at 255-256.
37. 307 U.S. 5 (1939).
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affirmative defense that must be proved.38  The Court then
clarified the issue of whether the knowledge of the inventor
was important.  The Court stated that a public use bar
attached irrespective of the patentee’s consent,39 changing the
prior law that public use only occurred when the patentee so
consented.40  The Court further stated that public use could
occur from a single commercial use, if that use was not
purposefully hidden.41  Thus, the ordinary use of the patented
machine within the confines of a factory – presumably a
confidential or private establishment – in the usual course of
producing goods for commercial purposes was a commercial
use.42  Accordingly, public use no longer required any
affirmative conduct by the patentee to make the invention
public.  Passive public use is still a public use.
As mentioned earlier, labeling conduct as an experimental
use may thwart the public use allegation.  Experimental use is
defined as “perfecting or completing an invention to the point of
determining that it will work for its intended purpose.”43  The
discussion about public use does not illustrate clearly how
experimental use fits in.  Thus, a brief discussion of the
experimental use doctrine is necessary.
IV.THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXPERIMENTAL USE
DOCTRINE
City of Elizabeth, NJ v. American Nicholson Pavement
Co.,44 was one of the earliest cases in which the experimental
use doctrine appeared.  The inventor of a new wooden road
pavement laid down the road on a public Boston street for
almost six years prior to applying for the patent.45  The
Supreme Court held that this was a not a public use within the
meaning of the statute.46  The Supreme Court noted the
following particular circumstances in determining that the use,
38. Id. at 17.
39. Id. at 19-20.
40. Id. at 19.
41. Id. at 20.
42. Id.
43. RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1061, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
1449 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
44. 97 U.S. 126 (1877).
45. Id. at 129.
46. Id. at 135-136.
2002] TO USE OR NOT TO USE 11
albeit in the open roads of Boston, was not a public use:47 the
inventor did not intend to abandon his patent rights;48 the
purpose of laying down the road in this public environment was
to test its qualities;49 the inventor was a stockholder in the
company that owned the road, even though the public was
entitled to use the road;50 the road pavement was made and
installed by the inventor at his own expense;51 the inventor
visited the site daily to observe the experiment including
taking notes of the continuing results;52 the site chosen was a
desirable site because all levels of traffic would occur over the
road thus resulting in diverse test results;53 a long period of
time (here six years) may be needed to obtain the useful results
of the experiment;54 the inventor did not voluntarily allow
others to make or use the invention;55 and the inventor did not
relinquish any control over the invention.56
The Court rejected the infringer’s argument that because
the public was incidentally deriving a benefit from the road, it
must be a public use.57  Rather, the Court specifically focused
on the nature or purpose of the experiment.  The inventor’s
need to place the invention on public roads to test it, heavily
favored the characterization as experimental use.58  Finally, the
Court noted that it was not the public knowledge of the
invention, but the public use that precluded patentability.59
Soon thereafter, the Court applied these experimental use
factors to another public use case.  In a remarkably similar fact
pattern, the inventor in Root v. Third Avenue Railroad Co. used
his inventive railway car cable road in San Francisco.60  Here
the inventor prepared an engineering plan for the proposed
47. Id.
48. Id. at 133.  But see Elec. Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5,
19-20  (1939) (stating that intent was irrelevant).
49. Am. Nicholson Pavement, 97 U.S. at 133.
50. Id. at 133.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 134.
54. Id. at 135.
55. Id. at 135-36.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 136.
58. See id. at 135-36.
59. Id. at 136.  Recall that the modern § 102(a) permits “known by others”
in the U.S.A. as a potential bar.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
60. Root v. Third Ave. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. 210 (1892).
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construction.61  The inventor participated in its installation and
use by the City of San Francisco.62  The road was used for
several years, with the inventor overseeing its operation.63  In
defense to the charge of invalidating public use, the inventor
attempted to analogize his facts to the previous American
Nicholson Pavement case.64  In particular, the inventor stated
that his use of the road was experimental in that he was
observing its durability.65  In rejecting his arguments of
experimental use, the Supreme Court stated that the inventor
sold his invention at a considerable price; that he treated his
invention like a commercial product; that he relinquished
control over it; and that if he wanted to make changes to it
(design alterations), he could not do so; and that the inventor
never examined it to determine its fitness for its intended
purpose.66
V. FACTORS OF THE PUBLIC USE TEST
Therefore, collecting factors from the various cases, one can
generate a list of factors to consider in determining whether a
use is public or experimental.67  These include: (a) the nature of
the activity that occurred in public;68  (b) the public access to
and knowledge of the invention in the public;69  (c) whether
there was any confidentiality obligation imposed on persons
who observed the use;70  (d) whether progress records or other
indicia of experimental activity were kept;71  (e) whether
persons other than the inventor or those acting for the inventor
conducted the experiments;72  (f) the number and duration of
tests conducted;73  (g) the scale of the tests compared with
61. Id. at 215.
62. Id. at 214-15.
63. Id. at 215.
64. Id. at 221.
65. Id. at 215-16.
66. Id. at 221, 225.
67. There may also be additional factors relevant to a particular case.
Netscape Communications Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320, 63
U.S.P.Q.2d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Allied Colloids, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d. 1570, 1576, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
72. Netscape, 295 F.3d at 1320.
73. Id.
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commercial conditions;74  (h) the length of the test period in
comparison with tests of similar products;75  and (i) whether
payment was made for the product of the tests beyond recovery
of the actual costs.76
The next section will examine each factor in turn,
discussing its importance and which cases, if any, give weight
to such factor.77  The courts look to the totality of the
circumstances when evaluating whether there has been a
public use.78
A. THE NATURE OF THE ACTIVITY THAT OCCURRED IN PUBLIC
This factor examines the environment and context in which
the activity occurred.  Although this factor is expansive in
nature, it plays only a moderate role in the overall analysis.  In
the case of In Re Smith, the court asked whether the
experiment needed to be conducted in a public place or could
have been performed at the inventor’s premises.79  In addition,
the court noted that where multiple devices were shown in
public, consumer indication of preference of one versus the
other negated experimental use.80  This is likely because this
activity is more akin to gauging commercial acceptability than
invention operability.81  Fundamentally, the Smith court asked
whether the purpose of the public use was to systematically
74. Allied Colloids, 64 F.3d at 1576.
75. Netscape, 295 F.3d at 1320.
76. Id.
77. Whether an invention was in public use within the meaning of §
102(b) is a question of law, which is based upon underlying issues of fact.
Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1591 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
78. Sinskey v. Pharmacia Ophthalmics, Inc., 982 F.2d 494, 498, 25
U.S.P.Q.2d 1290, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l
Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 971, 220 U.S.P.Q. 577, 582 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
79. In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135, 218 U.S.P.Q. 976, 983 (Fed. Cir.
1983).  Smith was a five-judge panel decision.  Id. at 1128.  The prior court,
the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) always sat en banc in a
five-judge panel and accordingly, every decision of the C.C.P.A. was
precedential.  The Federal Circuit was created on October 1, 1982 as part of
the Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
The Smith case was decided in August 1983.  Accordingly, the case was likely
briefed and argued before the creation of the Federal Circuit but decided after
its creation.  Accordingly, Smith ought to be considered a controlling case
given that it is a five-judge panel decision.
80. See Smith, 714 F.2d at 1135.
81. Id.
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identify technical problems in the product.82  The Smith court
specifically noted that the inventive carpet freshener did not
have to be tested by housewives, but could have been tested in
a laboratory.83  This is strong evidence that the court ought to
construe any public use to determine if it was necessary to test
in public versus in controlled situations.
In Allied Colloids, the alleged public use occurred at a
customer’s location.84  The invention involved the degradation
of biologic sewage, so it had to be tested in situ because
biological activity is different amongst sewage and laboratory
testing does not guarantee the same results as testing in situ.85
Therefore, use at a customer’s location does not automatically
negate experimental use.86
In addition, this factor requires consideration of whether it
is necessary to test the invention in public.  For example, in the
medical products analysis, the patentee could argue quite
logically that medical devices or drugs that are ultimately
bound for human beings require human testing.  But it is plain
that medical devices and drugs are often tested initially in
animal models.  Excellent data can be obtained from animal
models. While human testing would assist the patentee in
obtaining the proper FDA approval, human testing is not itself
a predicate for patentability.  After all, if the patent claims are
broadly drafted not to specify the conditions of intended use,
then public use may invalidate any such claims.  If, however,
some claims are more narrowly drafted to require human use
or administration – for example a method of treating pain
comprised of administering chemical X to a human patient –
then the human clinical trial may be necessary to perfect the
invention and prior animal testing public use may not itself
invalidate these claims.
Because doctors often use medical devices in the hospital
82. Id. at 1136 (citing Omark Indus. v. Carlton Co., 652 F.2d 783, 787, 212
U.S.P.Q. 413, 416-17 (9th Cir. 1980)).
83. In re Smith, 714 F.2d at 1135, 218 U.S.P.Q. at 983.  In Smith, seventy-
six housewives were given the carpet freshener to use on their own home
carpets.  Id. at 1137.  This was to purportedly evaluate characteristics such as
vacuumability, odor control, granular size, effectiveness in different type of
carpets (e.g., shag versus pile), etc.  Id. at 1135-36.  The court noted that the
tests could have been done in laboratory conditions.  Id. at 1135.
84. Allied Colloids, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d. 1570, 1573, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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environment, it is tempting to argue that use in the hospital,
especially in an operating room, is not a public use.  After all,
operating rooms are not within the general public’s access.
Accordingly, because the public cannot access the situs of the
medical device use, it can be argued that the use is not a public
use within the meaning of the statute.  However, the court in
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing v. Research Medical Inc.,
(“3M”)87 addressed this situation differently.
In 3M, the invention involved a venous return catheter,
which is used to drain blood from the heart to prevent excess
bleeding.88  Plainly, this invention must be used in the clinical
environment.  In describing the nature of the public use that
occurred, the court noted that the public use evidence consisted
of use by independent third party doctors.89  Each doctor used
the same or similar device in the hospital environment.90  In
fact, one doctor conducted one of his uses in association with
the inventor in the operating room itself.91  This may tend to
show that skilled artisans may be present in the operating
rooms, and the use may be considered public.
3M argued that these independent uses at the hospital
were not public uses.  The court, however, disagreed.
Specifically, the court noted that the use was not secret, the
device was completed, and more importantly, the use occurred
in the environment in which it was naturally intended to be
used.92  To the court, the uses of the catheter in the operating
rooms were not secret uses because the invention was intended
to be used in these rooms.  Moreover, the uses were not under
the control of the inventor because the doctors were third
parties.93
Therefore, an inventor cannot argue that because the
87. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Research Med., Inc., 679 F. Supp. 1037, 6
U.S.P.Q.2d 1401 (D. Utah 1987).
88. Id. at 1040.
89. Id. at 1045-48.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1047 (“Dr. Flege and Hancock discussed with Amrine [the
inventor of the patent in suit] the construction and use of the catheter, and
permitted him to observe its performance during open heart surgeries by Dr.
Flege.”).
92. Id. at 1049 (citing Bourne v. Jones, 114 F. Supp. 413, 419, 98 U.S.P.Q.
206, 210 (S.D. Fla. 1951), aff’d by adoption, 207 F.2d 173, 98 U.S.P.Q. 205 (5th
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 897 (1953); see also Marrese v. Richard’s
Med. Equip., 504 F.2d 479, 183 U.S.P.Q. 517 (7th Cir. 1974).
93. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 679 F. Supp. at 1045-48.
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invention involved a medical device, that ipso facto, the
hospital setting testing was a non-public use.  Furthermore,
because the nature of the intended invention contemplates use
in the hospital, and because hospitals are not necessarily
limited public access areas, a clever infringer may succeed in
discovering the nature and circumstances of the putative public
use by the inventor or by others.
B. THE PUBLIC ACCESS TO AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE PUBLIC USE
Generally, the wider the access the public has to the
invention, the more likely a public use will be found.94  This is
because, as the number of exposures increases, the more
irrefutable it becomes that members of the exposed public
would conclude that the invention was not confidential and
was, therefore, free to be used indiscriminately.  Although the
Supreme Court in Egbert v. Lippmann found a public use by
the inventor who demonstrated the invention to one non-
related person on one single occasion,95 the court stated that a
finding of public use does not depend on the number of people
to whom its use is known.  The district court in System
Management Arts v. Avesta Technologies96 found relevant the
[large] number of people to whom the invention or product
embodying the invention was disclosed.97
Pantentees often argue that the use was hidden and thus
was not public.  That is, the public had no access to, or
knowledge of, the invention.  Hidden uses occur most
frequently in the context of patented components as part of a
larger assembly, where the assembly will be sold or used in
gross, and will rarely be disassembled.  Hidden uses may also
include patented processes used in companies to churn out a
94. See Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Carella v. Starlight Archery,
804 F.2d 135, 231 U.S.P.Q. 644, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1209  (Fed. Cir. 1986).
95. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 336 (1881).
96. Sys. Mgmt. Arts v. Avesta Techs. Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 258, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
97. Id. at 264 (citing Articulate Sys., Inc. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 53 F.
Supp.2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999)). The System Management court added the factor
that it must be the invention itself as claimed (versus unclaimed) that must be
in public use.  Id.  As an aside, if the court finds that the claimed invention as
a whole was not in public use, but some part of the invention was in public
use, then this “public use” part can be combined with other evidence to show
that the claimed invention was obvious. This is because the past partial
conduct is prior art and can be combined with other evidence in the traditional
obviousness analysis.  See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
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final unpatented product.  Examining or reverse engineering
the final unpatented product does not yield the patented
process.  Arguably, the general public does not have access to
the company floor and thus, arguably, it is not in public.  Thus,
the hidden nature of the use is also a factor because an
invisible use plausibly means that the inventor did not perceive
as necessary more precautions to protect confidentiality.98
For example, in the Manville Sales case, Manville was
found to have done nothing to lead the public to believe that its
invention was in the public domain.99  The site of the use was
not actually in public – that is, the highway rest area where the
light pole assembly was installed was in fact not open to the
public – and Manville only communicated with one person
regarding the invention.100  The documents reflecting the
testing of the invention were stamped “confidential”.101  In
addition, even if the public could access the site, the invention
was not easily in public view as it rested atop a 150-foot pole.102
Also, the fact that Manville tested the product outdoors does
not automatically require a public use determination.  When
98. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 550, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“the invention was mounted atop a 150 foot
tall pole in a rest area still closed to the public, making it very unlikely that
the public would even see the new design”); Allied Colloids, Inc. v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d. 1570, 1574, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(public access to and knowledge of the public use is one of the factors to
consider).
99. Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 550.
100. Id.  Manville made no attempts to commercialize its invention
indicating that it intended to maintain ownership of it.  Id.  The court even
noted that Manville could have sold it under the rubric of experimental
purposes without losing the protection of the experimental use.  Id.  In some
cases, commercially-motivated activity may implicate both the public use and
the on-sale bars of § 102.  Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d
1261, 1266-67 n.3, 229 U.S.P.Q. 805 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  Any commercial activity
“must be merely incidental to the primary purpose of experimentation to
perfect the invention.”  LaBounty Mfg. Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1071, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing
Pennwalt Corp. v. Akzona Inc., 740 F.2d 1573, 1580-81, 222 U.S.P.Q. 833, 838
(Fed. Cir. 1984)).  This theory may find support in the 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
jurisprudence because testing and sale of medical devices or drugs for the
purposes of gaining FDA approval data is an exemption from patent
infringement.  See generally Upadhye, supra note 1.  It makes sense that if a
medical company can be exempted from infringement for “selling” FDA
approval products for the purposes of gaining FDA approval, then surely any
commercial activity that is necessary for effectuating the experimental use
should be non-barring activity.
101. Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 550.
102. Id.
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the product is intended for a particular purpose, testing in its
ultimate use environment may be necessary to determine
operability as intended.103  Accordingly, the public had very
little access to, or little knowledge of, the invention atop the
pole.
Whether the public has access to drugs or devices depends
on timing and the nature of the invention.  For time-related
issues, a device could become public after manufacture or
through the distribution chain.  That is, the public becomes
exposed to the device throughout the logistics chain.  It
becomes a public use, though, when it is used for its intended
purpose.  So a public use of a devise may occur only during use
or implantation.  The question, therefore, is whether the public
had access to, or knowledge of, the device contemporaneous
with the barring use.  For drugs, the same questions exist.
Concerning the nature of the invention, plainly some
inventions are not used in the open public, but nonetheless may
be a public use within the meaning of the law.  After all, the
general public does not have access to an implanted medical
device.  Obviously, drugs are not “accessible” to the general
public.  But for communication by the patient, the public
generally has no knowledge of the invention.
C. WHETHER THERE WAS ANY CONFIDENTIALITY OBLIGATION
IMPOSED ON PERSONS WHO OBSERVED THE USE
The imposition of a confidentiality obligation on persons
who observe the use is an extremely important factor.  Recall
that one policy underlying the public use bar is that it prohibits
the removal from the public domain of inventions the public
has been led to believe belong in the public domain.104  If a
person is obligated under a confidentiality agreement to keep
the invention secret, this forms a solid basis that no reasonable
person under such a confidence could believe he was free to use
the invention.  If the very nature of experimental or non-public
use is the lack of publicity, then “the presence or absence of a
secrecy agreement appear[s] to carry the most weight.”105  If an
obligation of confidentiality is important, then how can this
103. Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 551.
104. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
105. Articulate Sys. Inc. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 53 F. Supp.2d 62, 76 (D.
Mass. 1999) (citing Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261,
1266, 229 U.S.P.Q. 805 (Fed. Cir. 1986) and TP Labs. v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc.,
724 F.2d 965, 972, 220 U.S.P.Q. 577, 593 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
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obligation be proved?  Generally, the inventor’s subjective
intent of experimental use is not given as much weight as
objective evidence.106  In some instances, though, the subjective
intent can trump documentary evidence.107  Subjective intent
can be demonstrated by inventor expectations.  The district
court in System Management recently indicated that an
expectation of confidentiality (versus an express confidentiality
agreement) may be relevant.108  Cases are opposed on whether
confidentiality agreements must be express or implied.109
For example, in Netscape, the court placed great emphasis
on the lack of confidentiality.110  In this case, the inventor
worked for a laboratory near Berkeley, California.111  He
submitted an invention disclosure record to his company’s
patent department.112  Because the nature of the invention
involved remotely accessing a computer database, the inventor
showed his invention to computing personnel at the University
of California (Berkeley).113  The court noted that the inventor
failed to inform the Berkeley personnel of any expectation of
confidentiality.114  Moreover, he did not inform them that he
submitted an invention disclosure record to his patent
department.115  Accordingly, he made no effort to indicate to the
users that a general confidentiality expectation existed or that
the attendees owed a more specific duty of confidentiality to the
106. Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 815 F.2d 1478, 1481 n.3, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d 1364, 1366 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  The court further points to In re
Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135, 218 U.S.P.Q. 976, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting
that in determining whether the use is experimental, objective evidence is
preferred and the inventor’s subjective intent is generally of minimal value).
While some courts may state that subjective intent is of minimal value, many
courts still state that the intended purpose of the use is a factor to consider,
which resurrects a possible subjective intent inquiry.
107. Moxness Prods. Inc. v. Xomed Inc., 891 F.2d 890, 892, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d
1169, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
108. Sys. Mgmt. Arts v. Avesta Techs. Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268 54
U.S.P.Q.2d 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
109. Compare Moleculon Research, 793 F.2d at 1266 (finding implied
confidentiality when disclosure made to colleagues), with Nordberg Inc. v.
Telsmith Inc., 881 F. Supp 1252, 1288-89, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577, 1607 (E.D. Wis.
1995) (finding no implied confidentiality).
110. Netscape Communications Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1321, 63
U.S.P.Q.2d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
111. Id. at 1318.
112. Id. at 1321.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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inventor.116
To add further emphasis to the lack of confidentiality, the
court specifically noted, “‘In some circumstances . . . it would be
significant that no pledge of confidentiality was obtained from
the user.’ . . . Lack of a confidentiality agreement is significant
[in this case] because [the users] were [Berkeley] computer
personnel who could easily demonstrate the invention to
others.”117
In addition, the court stated categorically that because
Konrad was the inventor, any limitations, restrictions, or
obligations of secrecy of others using the inventions was owed
to Konrad, not to persons or entities funding the activities.118
The onus was on the inventor to protect the confidentiality of
the invention.119
Tempering this weight given to confidentiality, in Allied
Colloids, the district court found the absence of a written
confidentiality agreement between Colloids and the City of
Detroit particularly important.120  The Federal Circuit,
however, stated:
Although a written promise of confidentiality is a factor to be
considered in appropriate circumstances, such as when persons other
than the patentee conduct the experiments . . . the absence of such a
promise does not make a use “public” as a matter of law, or outweigh
the undisputed fact that no information of a confidential nature was
communicated to others.
121
Therefore, the existence of an express or implied
confidentiality agreement is merely another factor to be
considered.
In yet another case related to patient use, in MSM
Investments Co. v. Carolwood Corp,122 the court noted that
patients were properly informed about the drug they were
taking, the inventor did not control the treatments, and no
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting TP Labs. v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 220
U.S.P.Q. 577 (Fed. Cir. 1984)) (omission in original quote).
118. Netscape, 295 F.3d at 1322-23.
119. Id. at 1323.
120. Allied Colloids, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d. 1570, 1573-74, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
121. Id. at 1576; see also Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1535,
222 U.S.P.Q. 553, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1984); TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 971-72;
Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266, 229 U.S.P.Q. 805
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
122. MSM Inv. Co. v. Carolwood Corp., 70 F.Supp.2d 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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confidentiality existed between the inventor and the patients.123
Accordingly, the court found a public use.124  But in TP
Laboratories, Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., the Federal
Circuit gave no weight to the lack of confidentiality limitations
because there was little probability that the dental patient
would demonstrate the inventive dental implant to anyone.125
Furthermore, the court attached no importance to the lack of a
confidentiality pledge.126  The TP Laboratories court reasoned
that, obviously, for an implanted device such as this dental
implant, the patient will be exposed to it.127  As a matter of law,
this exposure alone cannot convert this implantation into a
public use.128  It is difficult to reconcile MSM with TP
Laboratories because on the one hand, the courts suggest that
the inventor must have a confidentiality agreement with not
only the doctor, but also the patients.129  On the other hand, the
lack of confidentiality agreements with patients receiving
dental implants played no dispositive role.130
In Moleculon Research v. CBS, confidentiality was again at
issue.131  In this infringement action, the court noted that the
inventor had maintained control over his invention.132  Because
he shared personal relationships with those to whom he
showed the invention, the court noted that this further
123. See id. at 1053 (explaining that Carolwood made out a prima facie
case of “public use” and that MSM did not offer any evidence to negate that
showing).
124. Id.
125. TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 972, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 593.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. MSM, 70 F.Supp.2d at 1053.
130. TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 972.
131. Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1265-66, 229
U.S.P.Q. 805 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  In this case, the Rubik’s cube puzzle inventor
initially made paper models of the cube puzzle.  Id. at 1263.  His two
roommates and a colleague in his class saw the paper model of the cube puzzle
while visiting him in his room.  Id.  Later, while working for Moleculon, the
company president entered the inventor’s office and saw the inventor’s new
wooden prototype.  Id.  The president and the inventor talked about the cube
puzzle and the president offered to commercialize it.  Id.  The inventor agreed,
assigning all his rights to Moleculon in return for a share of any proceeds.  Id.
Thereafter, Moleculon contacted various toy companies to commercialize it but
did not succeed in marketing the cube puzzle.  Id.  The inventor eventually
filed a patent application on behalf of Moleculon in 1970, and a patent was
issued on April 11, 1972.  Id.
132. Id. at 1266.
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demonstrated control over the invention.133  The court
characterized the inventor’s use as “private and for his own
enjoyment.”134  The court specifically noted that even though no
confidentiality agreement existed between the inventor and the
president, the presence or absence of any such agreement was
not determinative, as it was but one factor to weigh in the
multifactor test.135
In summary, the nature of public use involves the
indiscriminant publicity surrounding the use.  Confidentiality
agreements (whether express or implied) satisfy three goals: (i)
informing the immediate user that he is not free to divulge the
invention and he ought not have any belief that the invention is
public; (ii) proving, as part of the totality of the circumstances,
that the inventor did not intend to relinquish confidentiality in
the invention; and that (iii) preferably, a document exists to
corroborate any oral testimony that the use was not public.136
D. WHETHER PROGRESS RECORDS OR OTHER INDICIA OF
EXPERIMENTAL ACTIVITY WERE KEPT.
If the patentee claims an experimental use, it must be
corroborated by documentary evidence.  The inventor must
maintain control over the testing.137  The inventor must have
controlled the experiments in order for the court to find an
experimental use.138  This is because experimentation implies
that the experimenter cares about, and is searching for, some
results.  These results could be failures or successes.  In
searching for these results, the experimenter has most likely
determined the means for the search.  That is, running
experiments would involve choosing the materials, the location
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See infra note 142 and accompanying text (regarding written
corroboration of oral testimony).
137. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517, 1526, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385,
1393 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (declining suggestion for rehearing en banc) (Michel, J.,
dissenting); Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab. Inc., 984 F.2d 1182,
1187, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1561, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also, William C. Rooklidge
& Stephen C. Jensen, Common Sense, Simplicity and Experimental Use
Negation of the Public Use and On Sale Bars to Patentability, 29 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 1, 30 n.144 (1995) (listing, non-exhaustively, the circumstances
relevant to experimental use determination and noting that “the Federal
Circuit does not require the lower tribunal to review each factor”).
138. Zacharain v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 185, 192, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1493
(1999).
2002] TO USE OR NOT TO USE 23
of the tests, the number of tests to run, any control groups
required, any recording instruments needed, and may also
include a hypothesis about what form the results may take.
Accordingly, after all this intellectual energy is spent
conceiving the testing conditions, coupled with the physical
energy spent performing the tests, it makes no reasonable
sense that an experimenter would not monitor the tests or
record the results.  Rather, it is perfectly logical that the courts
would require documentary evidence of putative experimental
use.  These documents would corroborate the existence of the
intellectual and physical energies expended.139
Furthermore, if one purpose of experimental use is to
determine whether the invention is perfected, then surely
documentation is necessary to show why changes to
experimental protocols or to the product, if any, were made.
The documentation may also corroborate why changes were not
made.  Improvements or alterations, if any, should be
documented so that successes or failures, analyses of results,
and reasons therefore can be documented.  Requiring
documentation answers the ultimate question of whether the
invention has been perfected.
But the question remains as to how much documentation is
required to support a finding of experimental use.  Does the
quantity of the documentation depend on the simplicity of the
tests or of the invention?  If the product needs to be clinically
safe, then is more documentation required to corroborate the
experimental use?  If the FDA approval process requires
documentation during the clinical trial, does merely complying
with the FDA requirements ipso facto mean that the FDA
documentation will satisfy this prong of the public use-
experimental use test?  FDA rules require documentation to
prove the safety and efficacy of the drug or device.  Once
approved, the company may begin interstate marketing.  Here,
though, the FDA approval can be based on a final product that
is already fully tested and commerciable, which is in turn based
on early prototypical devices, such that approval is necessary to
even begin clinical testing, or some intermediate.  But again,
recall that the invention that is tested in clinical trials may be
generations later than what could have been patented (or
applied for in an application) in earlier development
139. See e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 814.20 (2002) (requirements of the new device
application to include documentation); 21 C.F.R. § 860.7 (2002) (for proving
safety and efficacy).
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generations.  Accordingly, many applicable FDA laws could
have little or no impact on the public use of an early stage
invention.  That is, the public use of an early stage prototype
may occur and bar the patent even before any relevant FDA
laws regarding record-keeping could be invoked.
Several cases determined experimental use despite a lack
of formal record-keeping on the testing.140  But if written
records are not necessary, then what weight is given to the
testimony?  Can oral testimony alone support a public use
change?  Generally, oral testimony of prior public use must be
corroborated in order to invalidate a patent.141
Written corroboration of oral testimony played an
important role in Juicy Whip, Inc., v. Orange Bang, Inc.142
Juicy Whip owned a patent on aesthetically pleasing drink
dispensers.143  The trial court below invalidated the patent.144
On appeal, Juicy Whip proffered two different reasons as to
why the district court’s ruling of invalidity ought to be
reversed.145  First, it argued that the prior art dispensers did
not include all the claim limitations.  Second, it argued that the
oral testimony provided by the six witnesses was
uncorroborated, and thus did not rise to the clear and
convincing evidence necessary to establish a prior public
knowledge or use.146  In response, Orange Bang (the accused
infringer) argued that the invalidity verdict was supported by
substantial evidence and that its evidence of prior public use
need not be completely corroborated by documentation.147
To prove invalidity, Orange Bang had to prove that each
140. TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 969, 971-72, 220
U.S.P.Q. 577 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding experimental use, even though records
were scanty at best, and noting that determination of experimental use can
only be made on consideration of the whole facts, including whether records
were kept); Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 551,
16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding experimental use with single
memorandum of intent to experiment but no records of testing).
141. See Finnigan Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 180 F.3d 1354, 1366-68, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1010-11 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The law has long looked with
disfavor upon invalidating patents on the basis of mere testimonial evidence
absent other evidence that corroborates that testimony.”).
142. Juicy Whip, Inc., v. Orange Bang, Inc., 292 F.3d 728, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d
1251 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
143. Id. at 731-34.
144. Id. at 731.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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element of the claim was taught in the prior art dispensers.148
But Orange Bang failed to show an element-by-element
comparison between the 1983 and 1988 dispensers and patent
claims.149  The court reviewed the record and concluded that no
reasonable juror could have found that Orange Bang
established that the 1983 and 1988 prior art dispensers
anticipated the claims.150 In observing the absence of some
claimed elements from the prior art, the court noted that most
of the testimony consisted of oral testimony.  By examining the
seminal Barbed Wire Patent case, the court also noted the
historical reservation toward invalidating a patent based on
uncorroborated oral testimony.151
In The Barbed Wire Patent,152 the Supreme Court
commented on the dangers of invalidating a patent on oral
testimony alone:
In view of the unsatisfactory character of such testimony, arising
from the forgetfulness of witnesses, their liability to mistakes, their
proneness to recollect things as the party calling them would have
them recollect them, aside from the temptation to actual perjury,
courts have not only imposed upon defendants the burden of proving
such devices, but have required that the proof shall be clear,
satisfactory and beyond a reasonable doubt.  Witnesses whose
memories are prodded by the eagerness of interested parties to elicit
testimony favorable to themselves are not usually to be depended
upon for accurate information.
153
The Barbed Wire Patent case involved a dispute over the
novelty of a patent owned by Glidden for barbed wire.154
Twenty-four witnesses testified that they saw an anticipating
barbed wire fence (the Morley Fence) exhibited at a county fair
in 1859.155  The witnesses included a boy who had been thrown
against the fence and cut by the extruding barbs; a deputy
marshal who hitched his horse to a fence post near the barbed
wire fence and returned to find the horse’s nose and breast
bloodied by the barbs; and a fair attendee named Potter who
saw an exhibit of the fence and was given a sample of the wire
by Morley.156  Potter testified that he kept the sample in a
148. Id. at 738.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 740.
152. 143 U.S. 275 (1892).
153. Id. at 284.
154. Id. at 285.
155. Id. at 287.
156. Id. at 286-87.
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trunk for more than ten years and then produced the sample at
trial.157  Potter’s son, however, testified for the patentee and
contradicted his father’s testimony, saying that no such barbed
wire was kept in the trunk.158  The patentee also presented
evidence including two copies of a journal that listed the notice
of the fair, but did not mention Morley or his fence.  The
district court discounted that evidence and the testimony from
the patentee’s witnesses who attended the fair but had seen
“nothing of the Morley fence.”159  The district court determined
that it was unlikely that all twenty-four witnesses were lying
and accordingly declared the patent invalid.160  Despite the
testimony of twenty-four witnesses and the credibility
determinations made by the trial court, the Supreme Court
reversed, reasoning that:
The very fact . . . that almost every important patent, from the cotton
gin of Whitney to the one under consideration, has been attacked by
the testimony of witnesses who imagined they had made similar
discoveries long before the patentee had claimed to have invented his
device, has tended to throw a certain amount of discredit upon all
that class of evidence, and to demand that it be subjected to the
closest scrutiny.
161
Per the high threshold announced in Eibel Process,162 the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in In re Reuters,
enumerated a list of factors to evaluate the credibility of any
oral testimony.163  They include:
(1) delay between event and trial, (2) interest of witness, (3)
157. Id. at 287.
158. Id. at 289.
159. Washburn & Moen Mfg. Co. v. Beat ‘Em-All Barb-Wire Co., 33 F. 261,
270-71 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1888).
160. Id. at 272 (“Not only is there an entire lack of evidence to show that
such a nefarious plan had been undertaken, but no motive can be conceived of,
that would induce so large a number of well-known persons to engage in such
a conspiracy.”).
161. The Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S. at 284-85.  The Supreme Court in
Eibel Process later clarified that the high standard of proof required when
using oral testimony to prove prior public use was not “beyond a reasonable
doubt” as stated in The Barbed Wire Patent, but was, nevertheless, a high
threshold.  See Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 60
(1923) (“The temptation to remember in such cases and the ease with which
honest witnesses can convince themselves after many years of having had a
conception at the basis of a valuable patent, are well known in this branch of
law, and have properly led to a rule that evidence to prove prior discovery
must be clear and satisfactory.”).
162. See Eibel Process, 261 U.S. at 60.
163. See In re Reuter, 670 F.2d 1015, 1021 & n.9, 210 U.S.P.Q. 249, 255 &
n.9 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
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contradiction or impeachment, (4) corroboration, (5) witnesses’
familiarity with details of alleged prior structure, (6) improbability of
prior use considering state of the art, (7) impact of the invention on
the industry, and (8) relationship between witness and alleged prior
user.
164
The Federal Circuit analyzes this corroboration requirement
using a “rule of reason” analysis.165
The Juicy Whip court then discussed other cases in which
the written corroboration of oral testimony regarding prior
public use played a role.  For example, in Woodland Trust v.
Flowertree Nursery, Inc.,166 the Federal Circuit reversed a
finding of prior public knowledge and use based solely on
uncorroborated oral testimony.167  There, the patentee owned a
method patent for protecting plants from freezing
temperatures.168  The infringer presented the oral testimony of
four interested witnesses (as opposed to non-interested
witnesses) that the protection method was previously known
and used by each of Joseph Burke and William Hawkins at
their respective nurseries in Florida.169  Hawkins’ son testified
that his father’s nursery was destroyed by a tornado in 1978
and not rebuilt until after the patent issued.170  Burke testified
that he used the patented system, but tore it down in 1976.171
In endorsing the testimony and thus finding the patent invalid,
the district court stated “to discredit those witnesses in this
case the court would be obliged to conclude that all four were
deliberate perjurers.”172  But the Federal Circuit reversed and
held that that “uncorroborated oral testimony, particularly that
of interested persons recalling long-past events, does not, of
itself, provide the clear and convincing evidence required to
invalidate a patent on this ground.”173  Specifically, the Federal
Circuit stated that on the facts presented, in view of the lack of
documents to corroborate and the length of time between the
164. Id. (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkeley & Co., 620 F.2d
1247, 1261 n.20, 205 U.S.P.Q. 1, 11 n.20 (8th Cir. 1980)).
165. Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1195, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1031, 1037 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
166. Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
167. Id. at 1373.
168. Id. at 1369.
169. Id. at 1369-70.
170. Id. at 1369.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1370.
173. Id. at 1369.
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invalidating activities and the trial, the oral evidence alone was
insufficient to invalidate the patent.174
The Federal Circuit also paid close attention to the
realities of modern times, noting that “the ubiquitous paper
trail of virtually all commercial activity” is present.175  Rarely
will there be a lack of some physical records “(e.g., a written
document such as notes, letters, invoices, notebooks, or a
sketch or drawing or photograph showing the device, a model,
or some other contemporaneous record).”176
The Juicy Whip court then analyzed Finnigan Corp. v.
International Trade Commission,177 in which the court held that
concerns regarding corroboration are not limited to “interested”
witnesses.178  In Finnigan, the patent claimed a method for
using a “quadruple ion trap” to generate a mass spectrum of a
trapped sample.179  The Federal Circuit held that the claim
required the use of a nonresonance ejection.180  The Commission
determined that an uninterested witness named Jefferts had
used the claimed invention.181  Jefferts authored an article that
taught each element except for the nonresonance ejection.182
Although this element was absent from his article, he testified
he practiced the entire claimed invention including the
nonresonance ejection limitation more than one year before
Finnigan’s filing date.183  In the litigation, Jefferts’s oral
testimony was the only evidence of the missing nonresonance
ejection limitation.184 The Federal Circuit reversed the
Commission, holding that under the circumstances of the case
before it, the oral testimony alone was insufficient to establish
prior public use.185
In the end, what we are left with is Jefferts’ testimony concerning his
alleged public use. Such evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to
establish invalidity of the patent.  This is not a judgment that
174. Id. at 1373.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Finnigan Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 180 F.3d 1354, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d
1001 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
178. Id. at 1367-69.
179. Id. at 1357.
180. Id. at 1364.
181. Id. at 1360-61.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1364-66.
184. Id. at 1365.
185. Id. at 1370.
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Jefferts’ testimony is incredible, but simply that such testimony alone
cannot surmount the hurdle that the clear and convincing evidence
standard imposes in proving patent invalidity.
186
After reviewing these oral testimony cases, the Juicy Whip
court determined that Orange Bang’s evidence of prior public
use did not surmount the clear and convincing evidence
hurdle.187 Applying the Reuter’s factors,188 the court determined
that: (1) “the testimony about the 1983 and 1988 dispensers
came more than eight and twelve years, respectively, after the
witnesses saw the dispensers;”189 (2) “Cretella, the only witness
to use the dispensers to serve drinks in public, kept the 1983
dispenser for only one month and the 1988 dispenser for less
than three months;”190 and (3) the six witnesses were interested
witnesses: two were defendants in the case, one was an
operations manager for the defendant, and one had a
relationship with the brother-in-law of one witness.191
Even though one document was proffered to corroborate
the oral testimony, this document was not even made until the
litigation started and was certainly not made
contemporaneously with the public use.192
One must remember that the written corroboration of oral
testimony rule does not mean that witnesses are not credible
per se.193  Rather, to prove invalidity by public use, it is prudent
to have or secure as much documentation as one can.
Finally, a parallel may be drawn between proving
inventorship and the requirement that inventorship be
corroborated.  In certain instances, proving who invented first
186. Id. at 1370 (citing Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1577, 38
U.S.P.Q.2d 1288, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that the corroboration rule
“provides a bright line for both district courts and the PTO to follow”)).
187. Juicy Whip, Inc., v. Orange Bang, Inc., 292 F.3d 728, 743, 63
U.S.P.Q.2d 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
188. See supra text accompanying note 164.
189. Juicy Whip, 292 F.3d. at 743.
190. Id.
191. Id. (citing Oney v. Ratliff, 182 F.3d 893, 896, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d, 1697,
1700 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The uncorroborated oral testimony of [the accused
infringer], as the inventor, and his close associates would be insufficient to
prove invalidity.”)).
192. Id. (citing Sandt Tech., Ltd. v. Resco Metal & Plastics Corp., 264 F.3d
1344, 1350-51, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “Documentary or
physical evidence that is made contemporaneously with the inventive process
provides the most reliable proof that the inventor’s testimony has been
corroborated.” Id.  (citing Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148
F.3d 1368, 1373, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998))).
193. See id.
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can be dispositive of who is entitled to the patent.194
Accordingly, competing inventors will each “prove” that he was
the first inventor.  The Federal Circuit has stated that a party
claiming his own prior inventorship must proffer evidence
corroborating his testimony.195  “This rule addresses the concern
that a party claiming inventorship might be tempted to
describe his actions in an unjustifiably self-serving manner in
order to obtain a patent or to maintain an existing patent.”196
Corroborating documentary or physical evidence that is made
contemporaneously with the inventive process provides the
most reliable proof that the inventor’s testimony has been
corroborated.197  Because documentary or physical evidence is
created at the time of conception or reduction to practice, the
risk of litigation-inspired fabrication or exaggeration is
mitigated.  In contrast to contemporaneous documentary
evidence, however, post-invention oral testimony is more
suspect, as there is more of a risk that the witness may have a
litigation-inspired motive to corroborate the inventor’s
testimony, and that the testimony may be inaccurate.198
By analogy, therefore, if an inventor has to proffer
documents to show that he actually invented something, when
he invented it, and the circumstances surrounding that
invention conception, it stands to reason that an inventor
claiming to experimentally use his invention ought to be held to
the same standard of documentary proof.  The same concerns
about fabricating or exaggerating the inventorship process
equally apply to concerns about how an inventor may try to
fabricate or exaggerate experimental use.  It should be noted
that the argument for documents is not that documentary
evidence is a necessary requirement and that the failure to
produce such documents necessarily leads to an irrebutable
presumption of public use.199  Rather, independent
194. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000).
195. Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1194, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1031, 1036 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
196. Singh v. Brake, 222 F.3d 1362, 1367, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1673, 1676 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (citing Kridl v. McCormick, 105 F.3d 1446, 1450, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d
1686, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The tribunal must also bear in mind the purpose
of corroboration, which is to prevent fraud, by providing independent
confirmation of the inventor’s testimony.”)).
197. See Woodland Trust, 148 F.3d at 1371-73.
198. Id.
199. Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 266 F.3d 1358,
1364, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1361, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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corroboration of the experimental use is necessary and that
documents can provide this independent corroboration.200
Accordingly, in the clinical trial or medical testing
contexts, documentation of any testing would be absolutely
critical to support any contention of experimentation.  Oral
testimony of the subjective intent of the inventor, as shown in
this section, is fraught with peril.  Using The Barbed Wire case
and others as a guide, it would appear that even many
witnesses orally testifying would still not be enough, without
some shred of written documentation to corroborate the oral
testimony.201
E. WHETHER PERSONS OTHER THAN THE INVENTOR OR ACTING
FOR THE INVENTOR CONDUCTED THE EXPERIMENTS
Relying on the theories above, maintaining the integrity of
the experiments is critical.  The experimenters maintain
integrity by doing the experiments themselves or maintaining
adequate control over third party facilitators.  Because the very
nature of experimentation implies concern about the tests, it
makes sense that the inventor – if he is not conducting the
tests himself – will surveil the facilitators.  After all, it is the
inventor’s contemplation of the invention that counts, not what
the facilitators contemplate.  The inventor must surveil
because once the invention works for its intended purpose,
continued use could transform otherwise non-barring
experimental use into patent barring public use.202  If the
inventor fails to maintain control, the progress from
experimental use into public use will occur unbeknownst to the
inventor.  Accordingly, many cases turn on whether a third
party was controlled by the inventor.
For example in Netscape Communications Corp. v.
Konrad,203 the invention involved remotely accessing computer
databases.204  Thus, the invention actually “resided” at more
than one location.  In Netscape, the inventor lacked any control
over the users.205  Although the inventor argued that any users
were experimenters, the court noted that all the inventor did
200. See id.
201. See supra note 152-153 and accompanying text.
202. See infra Part V.F.
203. Netscape Communications Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 63
U.S.P.Q.2d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
204. Id. at 1318.
205. Id. at 1322.
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was turn on the machine and let users use the machine.206
There was nothing to control who used the machine, what those
users did with the machine, and what the users could say or do
after using the machine.207  In other words, the inventor invited
public use of the machine.  Therefore, Netscape is an example
where the inventor lacked any control over the invention.
In MSM Investments Co. v. Carolwood Corp.,208 the court
noted that certain activities carried out in a health care clinic
constituted a public use.209  In particular, the court noted that a
third party doctor had administered the patented drug to
patients in the clinic.210  The doctor obtained the drug from the
inventor but the inventor did not control the drug’s subsequent
use at the clinic.211  Thus, the patent was invalidated.212  This
case is an example of how the lack of inventor control over the
actual public user can jeopardize the patent rights.  Here it was
clear that the drug’s inventor did nothing to monitor or control
the experiments, hence, the experimental use shroud did not
shield the in-clinic use.
In C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc.,213 in his concurrence
on invalidity, Judge Bryson noted that the putative
experiments were conducted at the purchaser’s request, not by
the inventor.214  In fact, the purchaser assumed primary
responsibility for the clinical trials and the inventor only
maintained passing interest in the trials.215  This demonstrated
to Judge Bryson that there was no control over the trials and
thus no experimentation occurred.216
With respect to inventor control over the testing in Lough
v. Brunswick Corp.,217 the inventor selected friends and
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. MSM Inv. Co. v. Carolwood Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (N.D. Cal.
1999).
209. Id. at 1053.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225
(Fed. Cir. 1998); see also discussion of C.R. Bard infra note 317 and
accompanying text.
214. C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1379-80.
215. Id. at 1380.
216. Id. at 1379-81.
217. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1100 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
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professional associates over whom he had control by virtue of
their relationship.218  Some Federal Circuit rulings allow as a
substitute for full control an inventor to exert control through
close relationships and notification of experimental purposes.219
In Lough, the court noted that “Lough was free to test his
invention in boats of friends and acquaintances . . . however,
Lough was required to maintain some degree of control and
feedback over those uses . . . to negate public use.”220  Therefore,
Federal Circuit precedent shows that participation by others in
the experiment does not equal a lack of control.221
Although the above are examples of how a public user can
trace its use to the inventor, not all public use cases involve the
inventor or those in privity with the inventor.  Often, the public
user may be a third party totally unrelated or unknown to the
inventor.  The problem is determining how the inventor can
protect himself from a third party use.  That is, if the inventor
and the third party do not even know of each other’s activities,
how can the inventor protect himself?  In short, he cannot.
Third parties may create public uses that will invalidate a later
inventor’s patent and there is simply nothing the later inventor
can do about it.
For example, in Baxter International, Inc. v. COBE
Laboratories, Inc.,222 the issue was whether a third party use at
the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) in Bethesda,
Maryland was a public use sufficient to invalidate an unrelated
patent.223  In Baxter, a doctor at the NIH had a problem with a
centrifuge device.224  The doctor contacted another engineer at
218. Id. at 1121.
219. Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1265-66, 229
U.S.P.Q. 805, 808 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United
States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1072, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1025, 1029
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (suggesting that notification of experimental purpose may
substitute for control).
220. Lough, 86 F.3d at 1122.
221. See TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 972, 220
U.S.P.Q. 577, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“routine checking of [success of the
invention] by one of the [inventor’s associates] does not indicate the inventor’s
lack of control”); see also Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 840
F.2d 902, 906, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1788, 1792 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (submitting samples of
the invention to food manufacturers for determination of the product’s utility
was not inconsistent with experimentation).
222. Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. COBE Labs. Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
1437 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
223. Id. at 1056.
224. Id.
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NIH and asked for help with design changes.225  The doctor
utilized the comments and built a new centrifuge.226  The
centrifuge worked properly for its intended purpose upon its
construction.227  Others came to the doctor’s lab at the NIH and
saw the centrifuge in action, including co-workers who were not
under any confidentiality duty.228  The doctor also did not make
any efforts to keep the centrifuge a secret.229  The doctor’s lab
was a public building and the doctor knew that people could
come in and out of the lab.230  No evidence was produced at trial
that co-workers were “ethically bound” to keep the device a
secret.231  Furthermore, any modifications made by the doctor
during the alleged experimental period were merely to fine-
tune the centrifuge to his particular purposes, not to test the
basic utility.232  Hence, the NIH use was public.233
Meanwhile, Baxter later invented and patented the same
invention, without knowledge of the NIH’s prior public use.234
Baxter sued COBE for infringement but COBE defended on the
grounds that Baxter’s patent was invalid due to prior public
use by the NIH doctors.235  Recognizing that this was a public
use beyond Baxter’s control, Baxter argued that the NIH
doctor’s (an admitted third party not related to Baxter in any
way) activities were experimental and thus did not constitute a
public use.236  That is, if Baxter could convert the NIH’s public
use into experimental use, then it would not be a public use
sufficient to invalidate Baxter’s patent.  COBE argued that
even though the doctor was a third party unrelated to any
party in the litigation, the doctor’s use was “by another” and
constituted valid public use of the invention sufficient to
invalidate the patent.237
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1058.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1058-59.
231. Id. at 1059.
232. Id. at 1060.
233. Id. at 1061.
234. Id. at 1056.
235. Id. at 1056-57.
236. Id. at 1059-60.
237. Id. at 1059.  Recall that 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) is not limited to
public uses created by the inventor only because it contemplates public use “by
another” as grounds to invalidate the patent.  See supra text accompanying
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The inventor of the Baxter patent lacked control over the
NIH doctor, thus supporting the conclusion that the use was
not experimental.238  Generally, experimental use is a personal
(inventor) based defense, and the NIH doctor’s use did not
inure to the benefit of the Baxter inventor and did not support
the underlying policies of public use.239  The court categorically
held that
public testing before the critical date by a third party for his own
unique purposes of an invention previously reduced to practice and
obtained from someone other than the patentee, when such testing is
independent of and not controlled by the patentee, is an invalidating
public use, not an experimental use.
240
Therefore, third party use of the invention by a totally
unrelated party that qualifies as a public use can be used to
invalidate the patent.
In Evans Medical Ltd. v. American Cyanamid Co.,241
another third party use case, the court used the oft-cited
totality of the circumstances test to determine if an
invalidating public use occurred.242  In Evans Medical, Evans,
as the patentee, was trying to prove that a use by Takeda
(another named defendant) was not public use within the
meaning of § 102(b).243  The court noted that Takeda made no
attempts to keep its use secret or experimental.244  The court
noted that Takeda sold the drugs to a U.S. company for ¥1.4
million – evidently a commercial sale.245  The court noted the
absence of confidentiality agreements between Takeda and the
U.S. buyer.246  The claimed invention, a vaccine drug, was
described in letters to the patients who were taking the vaccine
drug, along with a history of the drug’s clinical trials in
Japan.247  There was no control over any subsequent U.S.
testing and nothing to indicate that Takeda monitored any
note 9.
238. Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1060.
239. Id. at 1060-61.
240. Id.
241. Evans Med., Ltd. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 11 F. Supp. 2d 338 (S.D.N.Y.
1998), aff’d, 215 F.3d 1347, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (unpublished).
242. Id. at 366 (citing Continental Plastic Containers v. Owens Brockway
Plastic Prod., Inc., 141 F.3d 1073, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 366-67.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 367.
247. Id.
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testing, even though Takeda was to be advised of any results.248
Finally, because Takeda had fully tested the drug in Japan,
there was no practical reason to re-test it in the U.S. except to
generate FDA approval data, thus indicating that patient trials
in Japan did not give any reason to question why U.S. trials
would produce different results.249  Thus, it was Takeda’s use
that caused the public use under § 102(b).
In Marrese v. Richard’s Medical Equipment, Inc.,250 another
health-care related third party public use case, the Seventh
Circuit251 rejected the patentees arguments that a use in the
hospital setting was not a public use sufficient to invalidate the
patentee’s patent.252  In this case, the public uses of the
patented anesthesia masks were used in two separate hospitals
over an extended period of time.253  The hospital uses were
completely independent of the patentee’s work.254
In yet another third party use case, Petrolite Corp. v. Baker
Hughes, Inc.,255 Petrolite did not contest that the patented
product was publicly used and sold prior to the critical date.256
“Rather, it argue[d] only that these pre-critical date uses and
sales were experimental ‘because the chemical was not known
to work for its intended purpose and . . . the transaction[s] took
place as part of a program of experimentation to determine if
the chemical would work for that purpose.’”257
The relevant facts of this case follow.  The invention
248. Id.
249. Id. at 367-68; see also Upadhye, supra, note 1, at 35-43 (indicating
foreign clinical data can be used for U.S. FDA approval).
250. Marrese v. Richard’s Med. Equip., Inc., 504 F.2d 479, 183 U.S.P.Q.
517 (7th Cir. 1974) (retired Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark, sitting in
designation and writing the opinion).
251. At the time, appeals from the district court involving patent
infringement were appealed to the regional circuit court in which the district
is located.  Per the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Congress created
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals by merging the Court of Custom and
Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) and the Court of Claims together.  Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).  The Federal
Circuit is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals from any
district court or the U.S. Patent Office.  Id.
252. Marrese, 504 F.2d at 482-483.
253. Id. at 481-82.
254. Id.
255. Petrolite Corp. v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 96 F.3d 1423, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
1201 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
256. Id. at 1426.
257. Id.
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involved methods of reducing the amount of hydrogen sulphide
– a corrosive and toxic gas – in oil and natural gas.258  The
chemicals used in the methods “scavenge” the hydrogen
sulphide out of the oil or gas.259  Concern arose whether the
scavengers could work in cold pipes during cold weather.260
Quaker Petroleum Chemicals Co. was the initial assignee of the
patent who then sold the patent rights to Petrolite.261  Quaker’s
inventors filed the patent application on December 23, 1988
and thus the critical date for analyzing public use was one year
before, or December 23, 1987.262  Quaker not only sold specialty
chemicals to customers such as Sohio (Standard Oil Company
of Ohio), but Quaker would also periodically deliver and install
the chemicals directly at the Sohio site.263  Accordingly, the
allegedly invalidating use was based on Quaker providing the
chemical scavenger to the various Sohio owned wells and
placing that scavenger in those wells.  As the gas was being
pumped, the scavenger would treat the gas and thus perform
the claimed method.  Quaker charged Sohio for this scavenger.
Thus, Baker argued that it was Quaker’s prior public use that
invalidated Petrolite’s patent.
Because a prima facie case of public use had been shown,
“[t]he burden was on [Petrolite] to present some evidence that
would raise a genuine issue of material fact over [the]
allegation of experimental use.”264  “To establish that an
otherwise public use or sale does not run afoul of § 102(b), it
must be shown that the activity was ‘substantially for purposes
of experiment.’”265  “Thus, Petrolite had to present admissible
evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact that ‘the
primary purpose of the work was experimental.’”266
In support of the validity argument, “Petrolite argue[d]
that the reaction product had not been shown to work for its
258. Id. at 1424-25.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1425.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1427.
264. Id. at 1426 (alteration in original) (quoting Sinskey v. Pharmacia
Ophthalmics, Inc., 982 F.2d 494, 497, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1290, 1292 (Fed. Cir.
1992)).
265. Id. (quoting Sinskey, 982 F.2d at 498 (quoting Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v.
Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1564, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1210, 1214 (Fed. Cir.
1987))).
266. Id. (quoting Baker Oil Tools, 828 F.2d at 1563).
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intended purpose prior to the [December 23, 1987] critical date
because the inventors were still testing it to make sure that it
would not form solids as a by-product.”267  But the undisputed
evidence was that, at least 20 days prior (December 3, 1987)
Quaker made the successful formulation to reduce the amount
of hydrogen sulfide to acceptable levels in its intended
environment, even in cold weather.  Thus, the patent was
invalidated because a third party public use of the invention
was involved.268
In contrast, Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems,
Inc.,269 held that determining whether an invention is “operable
for its intended purpose in its intended environment” is not a
statutory public use.270  In that case, the district court found
that the patent at issue was not invalid because of the on sale
or public use bar.271  The Manville court affirmed, noting that
the patentee “did nothing to lead the public to believe that
its . . . invention was in ‘the public domain;’” that the patentee
“did not attempt to extend the patent term by commercially
exploiting its invention more than one year before it filed a
patent application” and that the patentee’s actions were
“entirely consistent with the policy ‘favoring prompt and
widespread disclosure of inventions.’”272  On appeal, the Federal
Circuit noted that the invention was “specifically designed to
withstand year around weather,” and as such, “[p]rior to
testing in the winter environment, there really was no basis for
confidence by the inventor that the invention would perform as
intended, and hence no proven invention to disclose.”273
In Petrolite, though, Quaker had used and tested its
invention in its intended environment and determined that it
worked.274  There was no evidence in the record that the
invention clogged the pipes or lost effectiveness at eliminating
hydrogen sulfide in very cold temperatures.275  Rather, there
was only subjective evidence that the inventors were not
267. Id. at 1427.
268. Id.
269. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
270. Id. at 551.
271. Id. at 549.
272. Id. at 550.
273. Id.; see also Petrolite, 96 F.3d at 1427.
274. Petrolite, 96 F.3d at 1427.
275. Id.
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completely satisfied that the invention would be free of any
such defects.  Thus, the court rejected Petrolite’s subjective
theories that a reduction to practice of a fully working chemical
process was necessary.  All that mattered was that the
invention could be used in public for substantially its intended
purpose.276
To support its subjective intent theories, Petrolite relied on
a memorandum dated March 22, 1988 (nine months before the
application filing date), to argue that “Quaker envisioned
continued testing for weeks or months to determine whether
the invention, W-3053, would cause solids to form and clog the
system.  But another Quaker memorandum indicated that it
believed that it had a marketable product as of December 3,
1987” (one year and twenty days before the application filing
date).277  Moreover, “the evidence showed that, even if the
inventors felt that additional field tests were necessary to
verify the invention’s reliability, Quaker was sufficiently
satisfied with it to promote and sell it to a number of
customers.”278  Petrolite’s arguments to the contrary could not
create a genuine issue of material fact. “The subjective belief of
inventors . . . must be weighed against objective evidence which
indicates otherwise.”279  “Petrolite also argued, inter alia, that
the district court erred in concluding that Quaker did not
maintain exclusive control over the testing of W-3053.”280  The
Federal Circuit disagreed.  The district court recognized that,
“[w]hile control is not determinative, it is an important
factor.”281
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. (quoting U.S. Envtl. Prods., Inc. v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 717, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d 1898, 1902 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (reasoning that “[I]f a mere allegation
of experimental intent were sufficient, there would rarely if ever be room for
summary judgment based on a true ‘on sale’ defense under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)”
citing D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 714 F.2d 1144, 1150, 219
U.S.P.Q. 13, 17 (Fed. Cir. 1983))); see also Sinskey v. Pharmacia Ophthalmics,
Inc., 982 F.2d 494, 499, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[A]fter-
the-fact testimony of an inventor’s subjective ‘experimental intent’ is entitled
to minimal weight.”).
280. Petrolite, 96 F.3d at 1427.
281. Id. (quoting U.S. Envtl. Prods., Inc., 911 F.2d at 717); see also Lough
v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1100, 1105 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (“The last factor of control is critically important, because, if the
inventor has no control over the alleged experiments, he is not
experimenting.”).
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In addition, the
evidence indicated that the security measures taken at the site
were standard measures taken by Sohio [and were] not
requirements imposed by Quaker.  While these security measures
may have been important to Quaker in deciding with whom it
would do business, there was no evidence that Quaker required
such measures.  Moreover, there was no evidence that Quaker
had entered into any secrecy agreement with Sohio, and Sohio
officials testified that they were free to analyze the reaction
product if they wished to do so.  The district court also found that,
although there was ‘strong evidence’ that Quaker regarded the
product as experimental, there was no evidence that Quaker
informed purchasers that the invention was experimental.  The
purchasers testified that the sales were ordinary commercial
transactions.  The experimental use doctrine operates in the
inventor’s favor to allow the inventor to refine his invention or to
assess its value relative to the time and expense of prosecuting a
patent application. If it is not the inventor or someone under his
control or ‘surveillance’ who does these things, there appears to
us no reason why he should be entitled to rely upon them to avoid
the statute.
282
“For example, Petrolite assert[ed] that ‘it is noteworthy
that Quaker substantially discounted the price charged for the
chemical to compensate Sohio for the risk it was bearing on a
‘100% experimental’ product.’” 283  That is, if the invention were
experimental, why would one pay “full price” for it, not knowing
if it would actually work?  The Federal Circuit noted, however,
“[a] patent owner may have created an on-sale bar despite
losing money on a sale.”284
With respect to inventor control as a safe harbor,
experimental use requires a benefit to the inventor and any
refinements must be made for the inventor’s benefit.  If a third
party who is not under the inventor’s control or surveillance
creates the refinements, there is no reason to apply the
experimental use defense because that party’s refinements
have nothing to do with the inventor.285
282. Petrolite, 96 F.3d at 1427-28.  (In this case, Sohio’s standard security
measures would be protecting the site hardware and installation area, or
fencing off the area.  Sohio took no other security measures to ensure that the
scavenger and claimed method were hidden from the public.) (quoting In re
Hamilton, 882 F.2d 1576, 1581, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1890, 1894 (Fed. Cir. 1989)); see
also Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1535, 222 U.S.P.Q. 553, 557
(Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1136, 218 U.S.P.Q. 976, 983 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
283. Petrolite, 96 F.3d at 1428.
284. U.S. Envtl. Prods., 911 F.2d at 717.
285. Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. COBE Labs. Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1060, 39
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In summary, third party use – that is, non-inventor use –
may create a public bar.  The problem with this rule is that it
becomes very difficult to protect the patent from the invalidity
challenge because the patentee generally has no control over
that third party’s activities.  In the medical field prior public
use sufficient to invalidate the patent may exist without the
inventor in question knowing about it.  As identified above,
control over others is extremely important and inventors must
police others to ensure that such control exists.  A medical
company can get into serious public use bar trouble if the
inventions are randomly distributed to others without
supervision, if the others do experiments without reporting
results to the inventor, or if the others design and run the
clinical trials without consulting with the inventor.
F. HOW MANY TESTS WERE CONDUCTED
It stands to reason that as the number of tests conducted
increases, the danger the invention may be perceived to exist in
the public domain increases.  It also follows that the greater
the number of tests conducted could mean that more tests than
necessary were performed.  Those extra tests could be
considered unsheltered uses.  In Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co.,286
Deere used a prototype planter for 1400 hours in plantings in
its own fields. Later, “Deere sought to test the warrantability,
durability, and acceptability of the planter.”287  Deere used its
independent dealers to make the prototype available to farmers
for further use.  The farmers used the prototypes for 1,500
hours in 16 states, totaling 40,000 acres of use.288  The number
of hours and total usage could be akin to running a large
U.S.P.Q.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  The court observed that:
One of the policies underlying experimental use as a negation of
public use is allowing an inventor sufficient time to test an invention
before applying for a patent.  “The experimental use doctrine operates
in the inventor’s favor to allow the inventor to refine his invention or
to assess its value relative to the time and expense of prosecuting a
patent application.  If it is not the inventor or someone under his
control or ‘surveillance’ who does these things, there appears to us no
reason why he should be entitled to rely upon them to avoid the
statute.”
Id. (citing In re Hamilton, 882 F.2d at 1581) (emphasis in original) (internal
citation omitted).
286. Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 222 U.S.P.Q. 929 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
287. Id. at 390.
288. Id.
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number of tests.  The Federal Circuit noted that Deere’s only
argument to defend against the public use charge was that the
farmers’ use was secret.  The Federal Circuit noted that even if
the use was secret, the commercial character made it public.
The court specifically noted that although secrecy is one factor
to determine if the use was experimental or public, secrecy
alone does not negate public use.289 Kinzenbaw also could have
argued the invention was adequately tested after 1400 hours
and the later 1500 hours were unnecessary.  While this case is
not strictly about the number of tests conducted, this case does
illustrate that an invention can be “secretly” used and still be
considered a public use.  By analogy, clinical trials often
require hundreds, if not thousands, of tests.
Because certain inventions must last for extended periods
of time, durability testing in the intended environment is also
important.  Testing durability is an appropriate consideration
in experimentation where durability is an implicit feature of
the invention.  This is true even when that durability is not
specifically claimed.290  To this end, most medical devices are
claimed via structural claims and it is difficult to structurally
claim a durability feature.  For example, stents placed in neck
arteries must withstand the constant rotational forces
associated with normal neck movement.  Of course, the stent
must last for years.  The structural component responsible for
the improved stent may be a specific configuration of struts
connecting adjacent stent wires.  A claim to the stent would
expressly claim the structural features of the stent struts, but
only implicitly call out the durability feature of lasting for
years.  Accordingly, large scale testing, with repeat testing,
may be necessary depending on the underlying invention.
G. THE SCALE OF THE TESTS COMPARED WITH COMMERCIAL
CONDITIONS
Commercialization could be the death-knell of
experimental use.  Accordingly, an infringer would seek to
characterize tests as commercial sales.  Merely because
experimentation occurs does not mean that the tests must be
free to the test subject.  Often in a clinical testing, the tested
289. Id.
290. EZ Dock, Inc. v. Schafer Sys., Inc., 276 F.3d 1347, 1353, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d
1289, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917
F.2d 544, 550, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1592 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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product is sold to the investigator.291  The question in this
circumstance is whether the price charged was reasonable.
Things to consider are whether the price charged was simply
cost-recovery, whether a profit was realized, whether more
products were sold than were reasonably necessary to conduct
the tests, whether the sales were to testers or non-testers, and
so forth.  Thus, if the scale of the test was large and some of the
above factors were met, the court may find the tests were more
commercial than experimental.
In Lough, the court halfheartedly acknowledged the
inventor’s steadfast refusal to commercially exploit his
invention before filing.292  Previous Federal Circuit cases have
attached great, perhaps dispositive weight to this factor.293
Accordingly, the scale of the Lough inventor’s
commercialization was small.  Simply because a prototype used
in the experiment was ultimately sold, as in Lough,294 does not
necessarily create an invalidating public use.295
Experimental use does not apply to market testing
situations designed to gauge customer demand.296  It should be
noted that merely because the experimental use comes in
contact with a customer does not per se disqualify the
experimental use and convert it into a commercial, and
therefore public, use.297
In Allied Colloids,298 the trial judge invalidated the patent
291. See Upadhye, supra note 1, at 39-42.
292. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1121, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1100
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
293. Ferag AG v. Quipp, Inc., 45 F.3d 1562, 1566, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1512, 1515
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Foremost among these is the policy of preventing inventors
from exploiting the commercial value of their inventions while deferring the
beginning of the statutory term.”); see also Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS,
Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266-67, 229 U.S.P.Q. 805 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
294. Lough, 86 F.3d at 1121
295. Watson v. Allen, 254 F.2d 342, 347, 117 U.S.P.Q. 68, 71 (D.C. Cir.
1958) (“We believe the protective umbrella of the experimental use doctrine
should include reasonable disposal of models and prototypes of the invention
once their usefulness to the inventor has ended – reasonable in view of the
nature of the device and the probability of discovery and appropriation of the
invention by strangers.”); see also Goodwin v. Borg-Warner Corp., 157 F.2d
267, 273, 70 U.S.P.Q. 387, 393 (6th Cir. 1946) (finding experimentation even
though the automobile containing the seal was later sold).
296. In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135, 218 U.S.P.Q. 976, 983 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
297. Allied Colloids, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d. 1570, 1575, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d 1840, 1843 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
298. Id.
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based on public use, as the patentee tested the product at the
site of a potential customer.  The Federal Circuit reversed,
stating that a jury could have found that the alleged public use
was not in public or was experimental.  Specifically, the
testimony showed that successful preliminary results indicated
more expansive tests were required.299  None of the intended
customer’s personnel saw the device in action, even though it
was at the customer’s facility.  None knew of the tests
performed or the test results.  Moreover, tests were performed
in a remote location at the customer’s facility.300  Although the
customer’s personnel entered the general testing area, they
entered for other purposes and did not observe the tests.  The
patentee’s personnel kept research logs of the experiments done
in situ301 and ensured strict control over test samples, the
testing period was very short, very small quantities of the
invention were used, and testing was free of charge (there was
no commercial gain).  That the patentee ultimately hoped to
gain the customer’s business did not dictate that tests the
patentee performed at the customer’s site were commercial and
triggered a public use bar.302  While not explicitly stated, that
the invention was free of charge likely weighed heavily in
finding no public use.  Combining the expansive nature of the
tests required with the lack of profit indicates that a direct
proportionality exists: a high number of tests, or large scale
testing, combined with a profit component would result in a
finding of public use.
The court reasoned that the law recognizes an inventor’s
need (1) to test the invention, (2) to ascertain whether it will
work for its intended purpose, and (3) to ascertain whether the
work is complete or what further changes are necessary.303
Such testing and development may even require disclosure to
the public without being an invalidating public use.  That the
public testing ultimately may lead to commercial gain does not
convert the testing into invalidating public use.304
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 972, 220
U.S.P.Q. 577, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (test logs are relevant to whether activity is
experimental).
302. Allied Colloids, 64 F.3d at 1576.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1576-77; Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558,
1563, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1210, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Grain Processing
Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 906, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1788, 1792
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In Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco S.P.A.,305 the court
stated that the determination of experimental use will depend
on the nature of the invention and the manner in which it is
utilized.  A patent will not be invalidated where “those who will
eventually be using the product under conditions that are likely
to be difficult to duplicate in the lab” conduct tests for
durability and performance.306  In this case, Caterpillar used
the invention at its own testing grounds.  On occasion, the
invention was placed on tractors owned by third parties in
separate states.  Caterpillar’s intent in field-testing was to
ascertain the operation of the invention in different soil
conditions in various climates.  Durability, life, and reliability
needed to be determined.  The invention had changed structure
and configuration as a result of the tests.307
H. THE LENGTH OF THE TEST PERIOD IN COMPARISON WITH
TESTS OF SIMILAR PRODUCTS
Under this factor, testing should be conducted in context
with the desired end use of the product.  For example, pioneer
drugs or devices will have no counterpart against which to
measure safety or efficacy.  That is, there is not likely to be a
similar product with which to compare such inventions.
Therefore, for pioneer devices or drugs, full-scale testing may
be necessary to determine if the device or drug will work for its
intended purpose.  Accordingly, testing ought to be carefully
tailored to the invention.308  Once an experimental purpose is
identified, the court ought to examine the scope and length of
the inventor’s activities to determine if they were reasonable in
terms of the invention’s purpose.309  This is important in those
instances where durability is required and a prolonged testing
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
305. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco S.P.A., No. C80-0384-B, 1982 WL
52145, 215 U.S.P.Q. 948, (D. Wyo. Sept. 30, 1982), aff’d on other grounds, 714
F.2d 1110, 219 U.S.P.Q. 185 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
306. Caterpillar, 215 U.S.P.Q. at 958.
307. Id. at 953.
308. City of Elizabeth, N.J. v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126
(1877); Allied Colloids, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d. 1570, 1577, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys.,
Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 550-51, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Caterpillar,
215 U.S.P.Q. at 958.
309. Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, 1322,
40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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period is justified.310
It should also be remembered that if the invention involves
a “me-too” type drug or device, often times large scale testing is
not necessary for the FDA approval process.  FDA laws permit
“me-too” drugs or devices to piggyback off the clinical trial data
of the predicate drug or device.311  Accordingly, it makes less
sense to permit large scale or long testing periods if a similar
product having a similar safety and efficacy profile already
exists.  Therefore, “me-too” devices or drugs should be entitled
to narrower protection.
I. WHETHER PAYMENT WAS MADE FOR THE PRODUCT OF THE
TESTS
Commercialization is antithetical to experimental use.
Accordingly, it would appear that this factor could be
dispositive of the public use inquiry.  But mere payment for the
alleged experimental device cannot ipso facto convert
experimental use into public use.312  If this were the case, then
payment would convert a multi-factor test into a single factor
test – something the courts would be loath to do.
One can also draw an analogy to 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) to
demonstrate why payments may be allowed.  Under § 271(e),
payments do not convert non-infringing use into infringing use
because devices and drugs are expensive to produce and
payments to recover costs are acceptable.  Accordingly, in the
experimental use context, any payments made ought to be for
cost recovery.  Thus, an inquiry into the profit motive may be
necessary.
Clever attorneys can argue over what constitutes a “cost”
for the purposes of calculating a profit.  Patentees will lump as
many expenses as possible into “cost” so the maximum possible
amount can be recovered within the shelter of experimental
use.  The ideal situation would occur when the payment price
equals the underlying costs the patentee incurred.  An infringer
will attempt to exclude most expenses included in the payment
amounts from “costs.”  The rationale is that if certain amounts
are included in the payment price, but are not considered costs,
310. Id. (citing Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 551.).
311. See Upadhye, supra note 1, at 26-28 & 48-60, (describing the PMA-
510(k) process for “me-too” devices, and the NDA-ANDA process for “me-too”
drugs).
312. For there to be a commercial public use, that use must provide a profit
or commercial advantage to the inventor.
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they are more properly characterized as profit.  Because clever
attorneys can argue “costs” as an integral factor of the
experimental-public use inquiry, it would be proper to itemize
via a bright line rule which costs and profits are properly
characterizable as implicating the public use bar.  In looking at
the test of whether activity implicates the public use bar, it is
useful to review cases illustrating acceptable payment methods.
In Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Products
Corp.,313 the Federal Circuit noted the testing period length,
quantity of invention shipped, and payments made for the
invention.  The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
finding that the use was experimental.314  The court noted that
it was industry custom for the inventor of a proposed ingredient
to submit samples to food manufacturers for their
determination of the product’s utility.315  Such testing was
necessary because the invention could interact with other food
ingredients.  Here, the testing period was very short, and very
small quantities of the samples were shipped free of charge.316
In C.R. Bard Inc., v. M3 Systems, Inc.,317 Bard sued M3 for
infringement of a spring loaded needle biopsy gun.  M3
asserted a variety of defenses including that Bard had sold
some guns to its clinical trial administrator prior to the critical
date.318  While the C.R. Bard court discussed the sale of guns
during clinical trials, it also drew parallels to the public use
issue.319
Judge Mayer, in his partial concurrence and dissent,
rejected Bard’s arguments that it had not yet obtained FDA
approval, had not conducted clinical testing, was not ready to
313. 840 F.2d 902, 906, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1788, 1792 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
314. Id. at 904.
315. Id. at 906.
316. Id.
317. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys. Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
318. See generally id. at 1356-57.  Bard quoted a certain price to its
potential marketing distributor.  Id. at 1356.  Interestingly, the same
marketing distributor also arranged for the clinical trials.  Id.  The distributor
purchased the 10 guns and 250 needles, and paid Bard (who had submitted as
standard sales invoice to the distributor).  Id.  It was undisputed, though, that
the guns were sold at cost and thus Bard derived no profit for them.  Id.
319. See id. at 1356, (citing In re Mahurkar, 71 F.3d 1573, 1577, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d 1138, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1995), for the proposition that “actual sale of
two prototype catheters did not place the invention in the public domain or
lead the public to believe that the device was freely available” (internal
quotations omitted)).
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distribute the products, and had not finalized the commercial
product.320  Judge Mayer noted that clinical testing is not
required before use or sale can bar patent rights.321  Later
clinical trials cannot save a prior use or sale, because clinical
trials “are merely one possible policy reason why [the sale or
use] might be excused from the bar.”322  Because the inventor
only contemplated the distribution of the guns to be sales and
not clinical trials, the later clinical testing was irrelevant.323
Moreover, Judge Mayer specifically stated that the FDA
approval process does not insulate sales because even illegal
sales could trigger the on-sale bar.324
In dissent,325 Judge Newman asserted that M3 argued
unsuccessfully that the “on sale” bar arose simply because Bard
used its standard sales invoice in connection with the clinical
trials.326  Judge Newman noted “cost defrayal arrangements
between collaborators are not deemed to be invalidating sales,
nor are payments for use substantially for test purposes.”327
The limited number of clinical trial investigators involved – in
this case only four hospitals – further supported the lack of an
invalidating sale.328  Notably, Judge Newman concluded that
the limited sale of guns to its clinical trial administrator did
not contravene the policies of § 102(b).329
A final interesting aspect of the C.R. Bard case involves
the subsequent device improvements made because of the
clinical trial investigation.  Bard argued that many
320. See generally id. at 1374-78.
321. Id. at 1376.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. The reader is advised to read the C.R. Bard decision carefully in order
to track the sections that comprise the majority opinion and the dissent.
Although Judge Newman was the primary author of the opinion, she dissented
on the “on-sale” issue by stating that she would have found the patents valid
on this issue.  See id. at 1354 n.4.  But Judges Mayer and Bryson teamed to
hold the patents invalid on the “on-sale” issue.  Accordingly, Judge Newman’s
dissent is placed within the main opinion, rather than at the end of the
opinion – and a failure to heed the instruction in footnote 4 (157 F.3d at 1354
n.4) may lead the reader to the erroneous conclusion that the majority held
the patents valid under the “on-sale” issue.  See also id. at 1369 n.9.  (another
admonishment for careful reading regarding antitrust issues in this case).
326. Id. at 1356.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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improvements were made as a result of the clinical trials; thus
any prior commercialization was meaningless.330  Judge Mayer
dismissed this argument, stating that improvements must be
both “inventive redesigns” and that these inventive redesigns
must be claimed.331  This reinforces the principle that for a
claim to be invalid, the subject matter of the claims must be in
public use before the critical date.332  Moreover, experimental
use does not apply to unclaimed features of the invention.333
Thus, demonstration of improvements that do not constitute
public use must be for patentability and experimentation, not
to make the invention more attractive to buyers.334
In summary, the above factors demonstrate that courts can
and will focus on one or more particular factors to determine if
an invalidating public use exists.  Courts can and will focus on
just a few factors without analyzing or balancing the others.
More disturbingly, courts can and will focus on the “control”
and the “written records” factors as the two most important
and potentially dispositive factors in the test.  Accordingly, one
ought to examine any investigational or experimental protocols
to solidify the degree of control and the quantity/quality of
330. See id. at 1377-78.
331. Id. at 1378.
332. See Scaltech Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C., 178 F.3d 1378, 1383, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d 1055, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  “A claimed invention is considered to
be on sale within the meaning of § 102(b) if, more than one year before [the
critical date] . . . the invention [is] ready for patenting.”  Id.  Proving that the
invention has been reduced to practice is one way of showing that the
invention is ready for patenting.  Id.  “The ‘invention’ which has been offered
for sale must, of course, be something within the scope of the claim.”  Id.  As a
result, the party with the burden of proof must show that “the subject of the
barring activity met each of the limitations of the claim, and thus was an
embodiment of the claimed invention.” Id. (emphasis added).
333. In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135-36, 218 U.S.P.Q. 976, 983-84 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
334. See Netscape Communications Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1321,
63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1580, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“To establish that an otherwise
public use does not run afoul of section 102(b), it must be shown that the
activity was substantially for purposes of experiment.”) (internal quotes
omitted).  An invention may exist under a § 102(b) bar even though it is later
improved or refined.  See Baxter Int’l Inc. v. COBE Labs, Inc., 88 F.3d 1054,
1059, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1437, 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing City of Elizabeth, N.J.
v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1877) for the proposition
that “[t]he use of an invention by the inventor . . . by way of experiment, and
in order to bring the invention to perfection, has never been regarded as [a
public] use”).  Accordingly, once the inventor realizes that the invention works
for its intended purpose, any later experimentation could be invalidating
public use.  RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1061, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
1449, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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written records.  Once these two factors are solidified, a
patentee stands a better chance of saving the patent from
invalidity.  That said, evidence of experimentation may exist in
other forms, and may play a role in determining whether public
use and experimental use are separate inquiries.  As shown in
the next section, these inquiries ought to be collapsed into one
inquiry.
VI.IS THE QUESTION OF EXPERIMENTAL USE
DIVORCED FROM THE QUESTION OF
PUBLIC USE?
Whether public and experimental use are separate
inquiries is important as it affects the burden of proof and
burden-shifting.  This is demonstrated by example.  In a
traditional patent suit, the infringer must prove invalidity by
clear and convincing evidence.335  The burden of proving
invalidity is on the infringer.  When the invalidity case is made,
the burden shifts to the patentee to rebut the invalidity case.
The infringer will then win the invalidity issue unless the
patentee can rebut it.
In the case of public use/experimental use, if the issue of
public use is separate from experimental use, then the infringer
need only establish a prima facie case of public use.  This will
shift the burden to the patentee to either refute the showing of
public use or establish that the use was experimental.  That is,
the patentee bears the burden of proving experimental use.
Unless the patentee proves this, the prima facie case of
invalidity will hold and the patent will be held invalid.
On the other hand, if experimental use is part of the public
use inquiry, the burden is on the infringer to establish, prima
facie, that the case was a statutory public use and not an
experimental use.  This favors the patentee because the
infringer shoulders the entire burden.  Therefore, the question
of whether the alleged conduct is a public use versus an
experimental use remains.  If the use is experimental, the use
is not a public use.336  Therefore, under this rule, an
experimental use ought to be classified as a non-public use,
335. Finnigan Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 180 F.3d 1354, 1365, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa &
Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360, 220 U.S.P.Q. 763, 770 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
336. Allied Colloids Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1574, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d 1840, 1842 (citing City of Elizabeth, N.J., 97 U.S. at 134-35).
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rather than being classified as an “exception” to public use.
This would be akin to treatment of hearsay in evidence law, in
which certain statements can be classified as hearsay (not
admissible), non-hearsay (admissible because it is not hearsay
in the first place), or hearsay but falling under an exception
(admissible even though it is hearsay because it falls under an
exception).
In Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp.,337 the court clarified the
procedural postures of a public use defense as applied to design
patents.338  Because the public use bar was an affirmative
defense and invalidated the patent, the infringer bore the
burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.339
The court stated that in determining public use, evidence of
experimentation is part of the totality of the circumstances
inquiry.340  The Federal Circuit took pains to state that the
public use inquiry is not distinct from the experimental
exception.341  Thus, the test was not “(1) was there a public use,
and if so, (2) was the public use for a bona fide experimental
purpose and thus excused.”342  The court reasoned that the
public use and experimental use exceptions did not require
distinct inquiries since both were grounded in the same
underlying policies.343
337. Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
338. Id. at 1197 n.4.  Under 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000), one may obtain a
design patent for “any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of
manufacture.”  The design must also be non-obvious.  § 171 (“The provisions
for this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents for
designs, except as otherwise provided.”); In re Borden, 90 F.3d 1570, 1574, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d 1524, 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  Infringement of a design patent
requires that the designs have the same general visual appearance, such that
it is likely that the purchaser would be deceived into confusing the design of
the accused article with the patented design.  See Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White,
81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1872).  The accused design must also contain
substantially the same points of novelty that distinguished the patented
design from the prior art.  L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d
1117, 1125, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1913, 1918 (Fed Cir. 1993); Lee v. Dayton-Hudson
Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1187, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1625, 1625 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Litton
Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444, 221 U.S.P.Q. 97, 109 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
339. Tone Bros., 28 F.3d at 1197 n.4; Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount
Sys. Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
340. Tone Bros., 28 F.3d at 1198.
341. Id. at 1198-99 (“Evidence of experimentation is part of the totality of
the circumstances considered in a public use inquiry.”).
342. Id.
343. See id. at 1199-1200.
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In TP Laboratories, the court stated,
[I]t is incorrect to impose on the patent owner, as the trial court
in this case did, the burden of proving that a “public use” was
“experimental.”  These are not two separable issues.  It is
incorrect to ask: “Was it a public use?” and then, “Was it
experimental?”  Rather the court is faced with a single issue: Was
it a public use under § 102(b)?
344
An analogy may be drawn to the on-sale bar.  If
experimental use is separate from the on-sale bar, then
logically it should be separate from the public use bar.  This is
because both bars are grounded substantially in the same
policies.  The dissent in Continental Plastic Containers, Inc. v.
Owens Brockway Plastic Products, Inc., linked the same
considerations to the on-sale bar stating that the on-sale bar
considered the totality of the circumstances and that
experimental use as an exception to the on-sale bar was part of
that totality inquiry.345
As mentioned above, one school of thought maintains that
the question of experimental use is part and parcel with the
public use question, in that experimental use is part of the
totality of the circumstances test.346  But in Lough, the court
asserted that the inquiry of public use and experimentation is a
two-step process in which the first inquiry is whether the use is
a public use and the second is whether the use falls under the
experimental use exception.347  TP Laboratories, the clearest
exposition of the unitary approach to public use, was decided in
1984 and Tone Bros. was decided in 1994.  Lough, however, was
decided in 1996.  To the extent that Lough is contrary to Tone
Bros. or TP Laboratories, the prior cases represent controlling
law.  This is because earlier panel decisions are stare decisis to
later panel decisions unless later overruled by an en banc
court.348
344. TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 971, 220
U.S.P.Q. 577, 582 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[I]f a prima facie case is made of public
use, the patent owner must be able to point to or must come forward with
convincing evidence to counter that showing.”); see also EZ Dock, Inc. v.
Schafer Sys., Inc., 276 F.3d 1347, 1351-2, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(clearly affirming that the inquiry is unitary and not distinct).
345. 141 F.3d 1073, 1082 (Fed Cir. 1998).
346. See, e.g., TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 971.
347. See Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
1100 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (explaining that “both parties agree that the issue
presented on appeal is whether the [public use], . . . prior to the critical date,
constituted experimental use so as to negate the conclusion of public use”).
348. Newell Co. v. Kenney Mfg., Inc., 864 F.2d 757, 765, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1417,
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Thus, if public use is divorced from experimental use the
factors for each test may be separated and independently
stated.  Although the following list of factors may be slightly
repetitive with respect to the public use test, the evidentiary
factors (discussed in City of Elizabeth, N.J. v. American
Nicholson Pavement Co. and its progeny) to determine if a use
was experimental include: (a) the length of the test period; (b)
whether the inventor received payment for the testing; (c) any
agreement by the user to maintain the use confidentially; (d)
any records of testing; (e) whether persons other than the
inventor performed the testing; (f) the number of tests; and (g)
the length of the test period in relation to tests of similar
devices.349
Furthermore, objective evidence “indicating a purpose for
such testing and experiment is generally preferred” where such
evidence may include: (a) whether the inventor inspected the
invention regularly; (b) whether the inventor retained control
over the invention; and (c) whether any commercial
exploitation was merely incidental to the primary purpose of
experimentation.350
As indicated above, some courts maintain the distinction
between the two questions.  Again, to the extent that some
inconsistency exists among Federal Circuit cases, a better
approach would be to adopt a bright line rule that places the
burden of proving experimental use squarely on the patentee’s
shoulders because many of the experimental use factors are
similar to the public use factors.  Eliminating such duplication
would conserve scarce judicial resources.  The infringer should
bear the burden of proving public use by clear and convincing
evidence.  To the extent that experimental use is an issue, the
burden should shift to the patentee (upon alleging the prima
facie case) to prove that any use was experimental.  This is
proper because, as explained above, most of the factors concern
the patentee’s own conduct, and who is better able to police a
patentee’s conduct than the patentee himself?
In summary, in the medical arts, testing drugs and devices
in vivo and in vitro prior to filing the patent application may
create significant problems.  Associating with physicians to
1423 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647,
652 n.6, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1465, 1467 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
349. See TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 971-72; In re Brigance, 792 F.2d 1103, 1108,
229 U.S.P.Q. 988, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
350. In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135, 218 U.S.P.Q. 976 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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conduct trials can create a panoply of problems based on the
sheer number of people involved and the very public nature of
the testing.  The existence of confidentiality agreements and/or
the degree of control over the testing will help insulate the
patentee from a charge of invalidity – as demonstrated by the
trend in recent cases.  Thus, in a multi-site clinical trial, a
prudent inventor or medical company should have
confidentiality agreements with the trial administrators,
attending doctors, and each enrolled patient.  Furthermore, for
medical devices, confidentiality agreements should be executed
with all the attending surgical staff; otherwise, a public use
may be demonstrated when the attending parties are not under
confidence.  These comprehensive confidentiality agreements
may seem unduly burdensome, but such agreements may be
necessary given the broad construction courts give the public
use bar.
VII. SHOULD THE PUBLIC USE/EXPERIMENTAL USE
EXCEPTION  BE LIBERALLY OR NARROWLY
CONSTRUED?
The ultimate question is whether a court should construe
the public use bar liberally or narrowly.351  Arguments exist for
both views.  One court stated the public use bar is to be broadly
construed.  One commentator suggests a narrow or strict
construction ought to apply.352  He suggests that the existence
of the patent term restoration provisions353 means pre-patent-
application public activity should be narrowly construed.354
351. For the remainder of this article, a “liberal construction of public use”
means that more uses would qualify as either non-public uses or as
experimental use and thus be “safe harbored.”  Accordingly, most patentees
will desire a liberal construction because liberality would shield more uses as
non-public uses.  In contrast, a “narrow construction of public use” means
fewer uses would be safe; more uses would qualify as public uses.  Most
infringers will desire a narrow construction because the patentee could not
shield his uses under the guise of “safe uses.”
352. Eric M. Lee, Public Use and On Sale Issues Arising from Clinical
Testing of Medical Devices, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 364, 375 n.62
(May 1993).
353. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000).  This provision permits a patentee to
recoup some of the lost time spent embroiled in the FDA regulatory process.
354. Lee, supra note 352, at 375 n.62; Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d
1543, 1546-47, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1996); cf. Pharmacia & Upjohn
Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 5 F.Supp. 2d 399, 400, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1831 (N.D. W.
Va. 1998) (contending that during the patent process, Upjohn’s reliance on a
critical limiting element of the claim meant that a reasonable competitor could
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This avoids the situation in which the patentee enjoys
protection on both ends of the time-line – the public use activity
at the beginning and the statutory patent term restoration at
the end.  However, the argument regarding patent term
extension for FDA entanglements only applies to medical
devices approved under the PMA process; it does not apply to
medical devices cleared under the § 510(k) process.355
Another argument for a strict construction of the public
use bar is the modest fact that drafting and filing a patent
application on a device or drug reduced to practice is relatively
simple compared to a full-scale clinical trial.  From a purely
economic perspective, detailed patent applications describing a
drug or device can be accomplished for $5,000 to $20,000 in
attorney’s fees.356  The U.S. Patent Office charges a filing fee for
submitting a patent application, which varies if the patent
applicant is a small or large entity.357  Small entities enjoy a
50% fee reduction.358
In addition to a fee reduction, fees are different depending
on the type of patent application filed.  That is, if the patent
application is a “provisional” patent application359 then the
current fee is substantially smaller than a “non-provisional”
fee.360  Table 1 shows the current fee structure charged by the
U.S. Patent Office.361
have concluded that Upjohn had relinquished control over claims outside that
limitation – thus implying that formal reliance on a technical element to earn
a patent limits the ways that the technical element can be construed).
355. In re Nitinol Med. Tech., Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1492 (Comm’r Patents
1990), aff’g denial of extension.  For a complete description of the differences
between devices approved under the PMA versus 510(k) processes, see
Upadhye, supra note 1, at 1-28.
356. AILPA LAW PRACTICE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE, AIPLA: REPORT OF
ECONOMIC SURVEY 2001 78 (2001) (reporting a median price of $9,967 for
preparing a complex biotech or chemical application).
357. 35 U.S.C. § 41, 41(h) (2000); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.16-1.21 and 1.27 (2001).
358. Id.
359. Provisional patent applications are governed by 35 U.S.C. § 111(b)
(2000).  Provisionals are not examined substantively and essentially sit at the
Patent Office until its expiry.  Provisionals never mature into an issued patent
but serve as a hook upon which later non-provisionals can hang.
360. Non-provisional patent applications are governed by 35 U.S.C. §
111(a).  Non-provisionals are “normal” or “regular” patent applications.  Non-
provisionals can mature into issued patents.
361. See http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/1999/fee20021001.htm
(last visited Nov. 15, 2002).  It is also understood that other fees may apply as
circumstances dictate.
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Applicant
Company Size
Provisional
Application
Filing Fee
Non-Provisional
Application
Filing Fee
Small Entity (e.g.,
individuals, small
businesses, not-for-profits,
universities, etc.)
$80.00 $370.00
Large Entity (e.g., large
companies)
$160.00 $740.00
Clearly the price of a patent application is nominal.362
A. THE PROVISIONAL PATENT APPLICATION AS A TOOL FOR
REFORM
In the circumstance of an individual inventor, the small
entity provisional application filing fee is affordable.  Any
entity may benefit from the provisional patent application
process.363  A provisional patent application provides the means
to establish an early effective filing date for a later 35 U.S.C. §
111(a) non-provisional patent application.  A provisional patent
application has a pendency lasting 12 months from the initial
filing.364  The 12-month pendency period cannot be extended.365
Therefore, an applicant who files a provisional application must
file a corresponding non-provisional application during the 12-
month pendency period of the provisional application in order
to benefit from the earlier filing of the provisional
application.366  Thus, if one were to assume that the public use
362. Even factoring in attorney’s fees – which are not necessarily expended
if inside counsel draft the application (ignoring the inside counsel resource
expenses) – the application fee is nominal compared to the potential future
benefit.
363. 35 U.S.C. § 111(b).
364. 35 U.S.C. § 111(b)(5) (“[T]he provisional application shall be regarded
as abandoned 12 months after the filing date of such application and shall not
be subject to revival after such 12-month period.”).
365. 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(3) (2000).
366. 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1).
An application for patent filed under section 111(a) or section 363 of
this title for an invention . . . shall have the same effect, as to such
invention, as though filed on the date of the provisional
application . . . if the application for [non-provisional] patent . . . is
filed not later than 12 months after the date on which the provisional
application was filed and if it contains or is amended to contain a
specific reference to the provisional application.
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started on Month 0, the inventor would have until Month 12 to
file a provisional patent application (or non-provisional patent
application for that matter) because of the § 102(b) one-year
grace period.  Then, because the inventor now has a patent
application on file, the inventor can publicly use, sell,
demonstrate, or publish the invention.367  The caveat is that the
inventor must file the corresponding non-provisional
application by Month 24 – within twelve months of the
provisional application filing date.  If the inventor does so, the
patent application then proceeds to examination and
subsequent issuance.
If the inventor seeks to establish the commercial viability
of the invention, the inventor has almost 24 months to do so, as
long as the inventor is willing to pay the costs of the attorney’s
fees in preparing the provisional patent application and the
nominal U.S. Patent Office filing fee.368  As a result, the
inventor is assured of patent validity, assuming no third party
public use.  It is hard to argue that the public use bar ought to
be liberally construed when this filing strategy is available.
A counterpoint to this strategy is that any patent
application filed (provisional or non-provisional) must embody
the statutory utility requirement.369  The utility requirement
embodies the question of whether the device will work for its
intended purpose; something that does not work cannot be
“useful” within the meaning of the statute.370  It is tempting to
Id.
367. Recall that the filing date freezes the universe of prior art that can be
used against a patent application.  Accordingly, post-filing date activity is not
prior art against the patent application (irrespective of whether the
application is provisional or non-provisional).  See supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
368. This situation can also be shown using days as the benchmarks.
Suppose the public use occurs on 01 Jan. Year 1.  The inventor would have
until 31 Dec. Year 1 to file the provisional application.  By filing the
provisional by 31 Dec., then the 01 Jan. use is not a § 102(b) bar.  The inventor
now has until 31 Dec. Year 2 to file the non-provisional application.
Therefore, the inventor can start using and marketing the invention two years
before investing time, money, and energy to push the patent application
process forward.  All that remains is to file the provisional by 31 Dec. Year 1 to
avoid public use issues.
369. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”) (emphasis added).
370. See, e.g., Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1340,
1345 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (court declined to issue the patent on a “perpetual
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argue medical devices or drugs deserve special treatment
because one can never be certain the invention works and thus
satisfies the utility requirement.  Courts have held, however,
that utility of medical inventions is measured under the same
legal constructs as “regular” inventions.371  It is tempting to
argue that drugs alone deserve special treatment because of the
unique biochemistry and pharmacology of the drugs reacting
within the body.  The inventor would argue that because of the
unique biochemical interactions, the utility must be measured
only when the invention is so complete that it is determined to
fully work for its intended use.  Nonetheless, the courts have
motion” machine because “[the machine] does not operate to produce what [the
inventor] claims it does”); In re Harwood, 390 F.2d 985, 989, 156 U.S.P.Q. 673,
676 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (“An inoperative invention, of course, does not satisfy the
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101 that an invention be useful.”).  The Federal
Circuit stated “[t]o violate [35 U.S.C.] § 101 the claimed device must be totally
incapable of achieving a useful result.”  Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1401, 1412 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(emphasis added); see E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkeley & Co., 620
F.2d 1247, 1260 n.17, 205 U.S.P.Q. 1, 10 n.17 (8th Cir. 1980).  The du Pont
court noted that:
A small degree of utility is sufficient.  The claimed invention must
only be capable of performing some beneficial function.  An invention
does not lack utility merely because the particular embodiment
disclosed in the patent lacks perfection or performs crudely.  A
commercially successful product is not required.  Nor is it essential
that the invention accomplish all its intended functions, . . . or
operate under all conditions, . . . partial success being sufficient to
demonstrate patentable utility[.] . . . In short, the defense of non-
utility cannot be sustained without proof of total incapacity.
Id. (emphasis in original, citations omitted).  If an invention is only partially
successful in achieving a useful result, a rejection of the claimed invention as a
whole based on a lack of utility is not appropriate.  See In re Brana, 51 F.3d
1560, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Gardner, 475 F.2d 1389, 177
U.S.P.Q. 396 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 169 U.S.P.Q. 367
(C.C.P.A. 1971).
371. In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 461-62, 108 U.S.P.Q. 321, 325
(C.C.P.A. 1956).  The Chilowsky court reasoned that:
There appears to be no basis in the statutes or decisions for requiring
any more conclusive evidence of operativeness in one type of case
than another.  The character and amount of evidence needed may
vary, depending on whether the alleged operation described in the
application appears to accord with or to contravene established
scientific principles or to depend upon principles alleged but not
generally recognized, but the degree of certainty as to the ultimate
fact of operativeness or inoperativeness should be the same in all
cases.
Id.; In re Gazave, 379 F.2d 973, 978, 154 U.S.P.Q. 92, 96 (C.C.P.A. 1967)
(“Thus, in the usual case where the mode of operation alleged can be readily
understood and conforms to the known laws of physics and chemistry,
operativeness is not questioned, and no further evidence is required.”).
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held that the threshold for drug utility is whether the drug
provides any immediate benefit to the public.372
To this end, the inventor may also be foreclosed from
arguing that in vivo testing is necessary because satisfactory
utility may be found by the prior in vitro testing or early stage
testing.373  The Federal Circuit has made it quite clear that
therapeutic utility sufficient under the patent laws is not to be
confused with the requirements of the FDA with regard to
safety and efficacy of drugs to be marketed in the United
States.374  Accordingly, because the threshold for utility is
relatively low, the patent laws permit the inventor to file
patent applications with a modicum of utility.  This means that
372. Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856, 206 U.S.P.Q. 881, 883 (C.C.P.A.
1980).  The court concluded that:
Knowledge of the pharmacological activity of any compound is
obviously beneficial to the public.  It is inherently faster and easier to
combat illnesses and alleviate symptoms when the medical profession
is armed with an arsenal of chemicals having known pharmacological
activities.  Since it is crucial to provide researchers with an incentive
to disclose pharmacological activities in as many compounds as
possible, we conclude that adequate proof of any such activity
constitutes a showing of practical utility.
Id.
373. Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1051, 224 U.S.P.Q. 739, 747-48 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
We perceive no insurmountable difficulty, under appropriate
circumstances, in finding that the first link in the screening chain, in
vitro testing, may establish a practical utility for the compound in
question.  Successful in vitro testing will marshal resources and direct
the expenditure of effort to further in vivo testing of the most potent
compounds, thereby providing an immediate benefit to the public,
analogous to the benefit provided by the showing of an in vivo utility.
Id.
374. Brana, 51 F.3d at 1568.  The court noted that:
FDA approval, however, is not a prerequisite for finding a compound
useful within the meaning of the patent laws.  Usefulness in patent
law, and in particular in the context of pharmaceutical inventions,
necessarily includes the expectation of further research and
development.  The stage at which an invention in this field becomes
useful is well before it is ready to be administered to humans.  Were
we to require Phase II testing in order to prove utility, the associated
costs would prevent many companies from obtaining patent
protection on promising new inventions, thereby eliminating an
incentive to pursue, through research and development, potential
cures in many crucial areas such as the treatment of cancer.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also In re Sichert, 566 F.2d 1154, 1159, 196
U.S.P.Q. 209 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Watson, 517 F.2d 465, 474, 186 U.S.P.Q.
11 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383, 1397, 162 U.S.P.Q. 594
(C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Hartop, 311 F.2d 249, 252-53, 135 U.S.P.Q. 419
(C.C.P.A. 1962).
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the inventor need not engage in full-scale trials to show that
the invention can work.  It follows that the public use ought to
be narrowly construed.  Because provisionals provide a lower
cost alternative to patent applicants coupled with the debunked
myth that full FDA type therapeutic utility must be shown
before filing a patent application, the public use bar ought to be
narrowly construed.
A counterargument to this strategy is that any provisional
patent application must fully support the later filed non-
provisional patent application.  Although provisional patent
applications have been around since 1995,375 few cases exist in
which the court rigidly examined the sufficiency of the
provisional compared to the non-provisional.  By way of
background, it is axiomatic that the subject matter of the
patent application is fixed on its filing date.  Matter in a
provisional patent application is given that effective filing date.
The filing date is important because it fixes or freezes the
universe of prior art that can be used against the application.
Accordingly, having the earliest filing date is critically
important.  In later applications that claim the benefit of the
filing dates of the earlier applications or claim priority to
earlier applications,376 the subject matter of the later
application is given the earlier filing date only for matter
common to both the earlier and later applications.  So, any
“new matter” in the later application is only given a filing date
of the later application.  The maxim is “old matter gets the old
filing date and new matter gets the new filing date.”  Therefore,
if the claimed invention is a hybrid between old and new
matter, then the filing dates are different and thus the
universe of prior art is different as well.
For example, suppose a provisional patent application
discloses subject matter X.  Within one year, the applicant files
375. Congress authorized provisional patent applications effective June 8,
1995, as part of the Uruguay Round Agreement Act (URAA).  Pub. L. No. 103-
465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
376. See e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 119, 120, and 121 (2000).  Section 119(a)-(d)
relates to U.S. applications claiming the benefit of earlier foreign patent
application filing dates.  Section 119(e) relates to the creation and
administration of U.S. provisional patent applications.  Section 120 relates to
the continuing patent application process.  Continuing applications can be
further subdivided into continuations, continuations-in-part (CIP), and
divisionals.  Section 121 relates to the divisional applications only.
Essentially, continuing applications permit a later filed application to claim
the benefit of the earliest effective filing date.
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a non-provisional patent application disclosing and claiming
subject matters X + Y.  Subject matter X has the provisional
filing date and subject matter Y has the new filing date.  Here,
the non-provisional application contains new matter that was
not taught in the provisional.
Returning to the timeline hypothetical just discussed,
suppose an inventor on Month 0 publicly used the invention of
X + Y.  On Month 12, the inventor filed a provisional patent
application teaching only X or insufficiently describing Y in the
necessary detail.  On Month 24, the inventor files the non-
provisional patent application claiming X + Y.  The patent
issues.  Now, an infringer may defend on the grounds that the
claim to X + Y is invalid because the subject matter Y has a
filing date of Month 24, and the public use of X + Y occurred
almost 2 years earlier (i.e., Month 0).  While any claim to
subject matter X only could chain its way from Month 24 to
Month 12 properly, the subject matter Y chain stops at Month
24.  So, the failure to adequately describe subject matter Y in
the provisional means that it cannot serve as an anchor to
subject matter Y in the later non-provisional application.
Recently, in New Railhead Manufacturing v. Vermeer
Manufacturing Co.377 the Federal Circuit found that the critical
part of the invention was not adequately described in the
provisional patent application.378  Although the provisional
patent application was timely filed within one year of the
public use, the later non-provisional patent application was
filed well after the one year grace period.379
The Federal Circuit agreed that under 35 U.S.C. §
119(e)(1), the old matter got the old date and new matter got
the new date.380  The court noted that the provisional
application text failed to adequately describe the angled bit
body and the drawings did not illustrate any angled
relationship.381  Because the claim now called expressly for the
angled bit body, that claim element had the non-provisional
filing date.  Thus the invention was in public use for more than
one year prior to the provisional filing date and was invalid.382
One may argue that the provisional patent application is
377. 298 F.3d 1290, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1843 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
378. Id. at 1292-93 (noting the lack of description of the angled bit body).
379. Id. at 1293.
380. Id. at 1294.
381. Id. at 1294-95.
382. Id. at 1295.
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designed for “quick and dirty” descriptions to secure filing
dates.  But inventors may still utilize the provisional patent
application process to secure step-wise improvements and yet
protect themselves fully.  For example, an inventor may
capitalize on the cheap provisional application filing fee by
using a “rolling provisional” procedure.
The rolling provisional procedure is best illustrated by
example.  Suppose on January 1, Year 1, the inventor files a
provisional patent application describing subject matter A.  As
the inventor further develops improvements in January, the
inventor files another provisional patent application on the
improvement B on February 1, fully teaching base subject
matter A and the improvement B.  Similarly, the inventor
continues improvements and on March 1, the inventor files
another provisional application on subject matter A, B, and C.
This continues until December 31 of Year 1, when 12
provisional patent applications will be on file, each teaching
various subject matter such that the December 1 provisional
patent applications contain subject matter for A through L.  By
December 31 Year 1, the inventor may file a non-provisional
patent application containing subject matter A to L.  This way,
the non-provisional application fully contains all improvements
made during that year and any public uses that occurred
during that year are of no consequence.
If the inventor feels that he is not yet ready to file a non-
provisional, he can delay the filing into Year 2.  The only caveat
is that on each first of the month of Year 2, a previously filed
provisional patent application will expire.  That is of no
consequence, however, if there was no public use or other
invalidating prior art.  Under this rolling provisional
procedure, as improvements are made, the inventor may
adequately protect himself by filing provisionals right away
and using that year to perfect more improvements.  What more
can an inventor ask for if the theories are that improvements or
refinements are made during clinical testing?  Here, the rolling
model adequately protects the inventor and the public.  Issues
of prior public use do not arise, and because they do not arise,
there is never a real inquiry into whether any putative public
use was experimental.
B. A NARROW CONSTRUCTION MAY AVOID ANTITRUST
CONCERNS
Antitrust issues arise in the context of enforcing a patent
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procured by fraud, in violation of Rule 56’s duty of candor by
failing to submit relevant and material prior art during
examination.383  This fraud on the Patent Office is also known
as inequitable conduct.384 Accordingly, when the inventor
engages in questionably public use, the inventor enters a
dilemma of whether to submit that test information to the
examiner – to comply with Rule 56 – or to unilaterally
determine that the use was not public and thus not submit it to
the examiner.  If the inventor’s assertion that the use was not
public is objectively wrong, the inventor could be guilty of
inequitable conduct.385
There must be encouragement for the inventor to disclose a
potential prior public use.  Narrowing the scope of public use
provides this encouragement.  If the public use is narrowly
construed, then there is less subjective belief by the inventor
that certain activities may be safe.  That is, if the scope is
narrow, then it is less likely that the inventor will believe his
activities are safe.  If he believes that his use is no longer safe,
he will be encouraged to disclose the use and let the Patent
Office decide whether it is safe or not.  So by reducing the
scope, an inventor who is not sure whether the use is safe will
be motivated to disclose it to the Office.  When the issue of
disclosure is a close call, the inventor should err on the side of
disclosure.386  When the Office examines that use and still
issues the patent, the inventor cannot be guilty of inequitable
conduct, as he did not fraudulently withhold the prior public
use.  Accordingly, where there is no fraudulent procurement,
there can be no antitrust violation.  Moreover, his patent will
be stronger because the Office would have already examined
that use and determined that it did not significantly affect
patentability.
383. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S.
172, 174, 147 U.S.P.Q. 404, 406 (1965); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 regarding the
duty of candor to submit relevant and material prior art to the examiner
during patent examination.
384. In re Hayes Microcomputer Prod., Inc. Patent Litig., 982 F.2d 1527,
1546, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241, 1255-56 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
385. Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1538-40, 222 U.S.P.Q.
553, 561-62 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
386. LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 958 F.2d
1066, 1076, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1025, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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VIII.  CONCLUSION
It is still better policy to apply the experimental use/public
use bar narrowly.  The above discussion illustrates that
application of the multifactor test is fraught with problems.  As
most factors are generally in the control of the patentee, it
makes sense to hold the patentee strictly to the test.  In
addition, the new provisional patent application procedure
means that the patentee is in the best position to draft fully
comprehensive and detailed patent applications.  The cost of
doing so remains less costly than drafting full non-provisional
applications.  Furthermore, because rolling provisionals
provide a vehicle to protect an inventor for all improvements,
the public use should be strictly construed against an inventor
who fails to capitalize on the tools now available.  In
complicated areas of law, such as patent law, bright line rules
will foster the competitive system that the Constitutional
framework set out to establish.  While many cases of the
previous era retained a flexible approach to the public use bar,
new cases and new legislation beg for reform in this area and
stricter application of the public use bar.
